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In the 2017 “Ten years in public health” report redacted by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), it was estimated that nearly 2 billion of people in the world had no access to 
fundamental medicines, “effectively shutting them off from the benefits of advances in modern 
science” as declared by the ex-General Director of WHO, Dr. Margaret Chan1.  
Lack of access to medicines causes misery and suffering: no cure for a child’s painful earache, 
women who unfortunately die during childbirth, casualties from diseases that are quickly and 
inexpensively prevented or cured. People in lower-income countries suffer from diseases going 
from the so-called “neglected tropical diseases”2, for instance, Dengue, Leprosy, Malaria, to a 
multitude of infectious diseases that in the First World are uncommon, such as HIV, Hepatitis 
B, Pneumonia, that every year kill millions. Lack of access to medicines is one inequality that 
can be measured by a starkly visible yardstick: numbers of preventable deaths (World Health 
Organization, 2017). 
This complex and vexing problem has been vastly explored, with an extensive literature on 
access to health and medicines, starting from income inequality, sustainable devolvement, 
exploitation of the poor, market failure, and other economic and social arguments. In this thesis, 
we will focus the attention to this issue from a different standpoint, which is perhaps one of the 
primary reasons for the difficulty for poor people to get affordable medicines: the 
Pharmaceutical Patent’s system. 
The International Patent’s system that, at the moment, is in force in all the countries that are 
part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the Agreement on Trips-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This International legal agreement sets down minimum 
standards for the regulation by the WTO members of many forms of intellectual property, the 
most important being Patents. This agreement allows an inventor, for example, a 
pharmaceutical company that invented a new formula for a drug, to enjoy the protection of a 
minimum term of 20 years from the filing date of the patent application for that formula, 
virtually guaranteeing a monopoly on the product for at least two decades. This duration hinders 
the free market on medicines, implying that the most influential companies in the world, which 
also have much more investment capacities in R&D with respect to small companies that 
operate in lower- and middle-income countries. Indeed, this kind of protection was put in place 
 
1 Interview available at: https://www.who.int/publications/10-year-review/dg-letter/en/ 
2 For the complete list of the diseases: https://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/ 
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to safeguard any inventors, allowing them to secure a fair amount of time to gain a profit on 
their investment and effort.  
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies exploit this insurance and strategically apply for many 
patents on a single drug, just making minor changes on the formulas, a procedure called 
“Evergreening”, de facto canceling any competitors. Humira, the best-selling drug in the world, 
brought the company that produces it almost 20 billion $ in global sales in 2018 (Mukherjee, 
2019), and is protected by over 240 patents, with all of them differing slightly from each other 
(I-MAK, 2019). This medication is used to treat different forms of arthritis and costs nearly 
$3000 per unit3. Does the expense that the company had incurred before patenting the formula 
justify this cost? What if an individual from a lower-income country has no financial capacity 
to buy such an expensive drug and still needs it? Is it fair that a company ultimately decides the 
lives of people that to them does not exist? 
In chapter one, we will assess the Agreement on Intellectual property, expanding on Patents, 
trying to find how they are valuated, and the different approaches that are currently being used 
for their economic evaluation. 
In chapter two we will focus on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the drugs 
industry, studying how pharmaceutical firms manipulate the market using the Agreement’s 
provisions. We will also underline the differences between the European and Indian current 
situation, both in terms of the industries’ characteristics and the patent systems peculiarities. 
Finally, in chapter three, we will present an empirical analysis where we use data from the EU 
R&D Survey containing various numerical information on the first 500 enterprises in the world 
in terms of research expenditure, and patents data from the EPO, to answer the main question 
of our thesis: is a model based on a strict patent system, such as the Indian one, able to stimulate 
research and therefore applicable to more modern industries, like Europe? In other terms: is a 
model that puts the public interest first rather than the interests of Big Pharma, able to represent 
an efficient and right example for the richest countries in the World? 
 
 
3 Source of the price: https://www.drugs.com/price-guide/humira 
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CHAPTER ONE: TRIPS, PATENTS AND VALUE OF 
PATENTS 
 
1.1 What is TRIPS 
Before the 19th century, intellectual properties rights (IPRs) were not considered a matter of 
international and intergovernmental discussion and their regulation were just a strict national 
concern. Although, during the 19th century, IPRs was the major subject of various international 
agreements4, striving for an enhanced international harmonization, they all suffered from the 
mistake of not specifying minimum standards for patent protection, causing them rather 
unsuccessful (Descheemaeker, 2012). In countries like the US and UK, IPRs have not only been 
patentable since the 18th century, but some of them (like pharmaceutical patents) received a 
special treatment, with a powerful protection for both processes and products. On the other 
hand, there were countries, especially developing and lower-income ones, that did not strive to 
create a very rigid intellectual properties rights system. 
 
After decades of diverging ideas, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, better known as TRIPS, was negotiated, under strong pressure by 
industrialized countries, between 1986 to 1994, during the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and successively entered into force in 1995. As one 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, it was immediately binding for the WTO 
at the time, and for the future members, who had to accept it to enter the Organization. The 
TRIPS Agreement is the first and the most comprehensive WTO requiring Members to establish 
a relatively detailed set of substantive norms within their national legal systems, and at the same 
time requiring them to put in place enforcement measures and procedures meeting minimum 
standards. Specifically, the rights that are legally guaranteed by the Agreement are: copyright 
and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, integrated circuits, 
undisclosed information and the most relevant, patents. 
TRIPS attempt to define an equilibrium between the long-term social aim of providing 
incentives for future inventions and creation, and the short-term aim of allowing people to use 
existing inventions and creations (World Trade Organization, 2006). 
However, adding to the fact that TRIPS has been sometimes referred to the first WTO 
agreement that prescribed “positive law” (United Nations, 2003) before its entry into force had 
 
4 1883, Paris Convention; 1873, Vienna Conference; 1970, Patent Cooperation Treaty; 1973, Munich 
Convention; 1975, Community Patent Convention 
4 
generated a considerable amount of controversy among the WTO members, particularly caused 
by the contentious between developed and developing countries. 
As mentioned before, the TRIPS established minimum standards for nearly all forms of IP, 
obliging Members of the WTO to provide protection for any sort of invention, whether it is a 
product or a process, in all field of technology, provided that the invention is new, involves an 
inventive step and is capable of an industrial application. TRIPS incorporated also various 
public benefit safeguards, for example public-health, allowing sufficient flexibility for 
countries to take their own intellectual properties systems and developmental needs into account 
and preventing the abuse of rules. Both minimum standards and public safeguard were the pillar 
of the TRIPS, which at the time were sufficient to consider it as the most important Trade 
Agreement of all time. 
The Agreement is composed by seven parts. The first two parts are concerned with rules that 
WTO Members are expected to implement and apply in their national legal systems. The third 
part lists the enforcement obligations of Members, and the fourth establishes the means for 
acquiring and maintaining intellectual property rights. The fifth parts is reserved to dispute 
settlement under the Agreement while the sixth and the last parts concerns transitional 
arrangements and other matters. Since in this thesis we take our focus on patents, in the 
following paragraphs we’ll review some of the relevant articles regarding them. 
In particular, our attention goes to Part II, Section 5, of the TRIPS Agreement5  (World Trade 
Organization, 1994), starting from Article 27 on Patentable Subject Matter where is stated that 
patents can be available for any inventions, both product and processes, if and only if “[…] they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”. It is specified in a 
comment that the terms “inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” can be 
interpreted as synonyms of “non-obvious” and “useful” respectively. It appears that a patent 
must be characterized by three key attributes, which are of course subject to personal 
interpretation. In Article 27 are also stated the reasons for excluding from patentability some 
inventions with the principal one being for the “[…] prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect public order or morality”.  
Article 28, titled “Rights Conferred” shows the exclusive right reserved to a patent owner 
thanks to which she can prevent third parties not having her consent from the acts of: “[…] 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product”. Also, 
“Patent owners have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude 
licensing contracts”. Article 30, on “Exceptions to Right Conferred” consider the possibility 
 
5 For the full document: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 
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that patents exclusivity rights may be limited, only if they “[…] do not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties”. 
For what concerns the “Conditions on  Patent Applicants”, Article 29 requires that an applicant 
has to “[…] disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention 
to be carried out by a person skilled in the art”  and “[…] the best mode for carrying out the 
invention”. 
Article 31 titled “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder” includes all the 
provisions that have to be respected when a law of a Member of the WTO allows the use of a 
patent invention without the authorization of the right holder. First, such use is permitted only 
if “[…] the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time”. This requirement may be waived by a Member in case of 
national or any extreme urgency, or in cases of public non-commercial use. In both cases, the 
right holder shall be informed promptly before the actual use of the patent. The scope and 
duration of such use is limited to the purpose for which it was given authorization, and such use 
must be non-exclusive and non-assignable. The use shall be authorized mostly for the supply 
of the domestic market of the authorizing Member and shall be liable “[…] to be terminated 
when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur”. The patent 
holder must be adequately remunerated considering the economic value of the authorization. 
Also, the legal validity regarding the decision about the authorization and the remuneration 
“[…] shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher 
authority”. Members can avoid to apply the previous conditions when “[…] the use is permitted 
to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive”. 
Finally, when the exploitation of a patent (“the second patent”) cannot be exploited without 
infringing another patent (“the first patent”), the following conditions apply: the second patent 
involve an important technological advance with respect to the first patent, the first patent 
owner “[…] shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed 
in the second patent”, and the authorized use for the first patent is non-assignable “[…] expect 
with the assignment of the second patent”. 
Article 32 states that any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent after a judicial review shall be 
available. The most important provision contained in the TRIPS Agreement is with no doubt 
Article 33, which indicates that “The term of a protection available shall not end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date”. The last Article on the 
section dedicated to patents is Article 34 titled “Process Patents: Burden of proof”. In particular, 
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if the patent is a process for obtaining a product “[…] the judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product differs 
from the patented process”. 
The TRIPS Agreement significantly potentiated the protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
by requiring all Member to establish a minimum 20-year period protection in all field of 
technology. Nonetheless, this treaty was strongly opposed by developing countries that did not 
have a strong IPRs system, especially for patents in certain areas of technology, such as 
pharmaceutical formulas, so they had to comply with TRIPS, amending their laws.  
In addition, TRIPS allows Members to use measures such as compulsory licences, parallel 
imports and exceptions to patent rights, and also to strengthen the patentability criteria.  These 
systems have been put in place to balance IP rights with public needs (especially health-related 
needs) and they can be used to increase competition and protect consumers.  
The main implication on public health that the TRIPS brought in at the time, was that the generic 
drugs production was somehow at risk in under-developed countries, which did not have a 
strong patent system. Right after the Agreement entered into force, the flexibilities mentioned 
before were challenged by international pharmaceutical companies and governments of 
developed countries that wanted to secure the monopolies that the patent system provided them. 
The continuing fights between the parts involved, led to the Declaration on TRIPS, which was 
adopted on the 14th of November 2011, during the 4th WTO Ministerial Meeting at Doha, Qatar  
(World Trade Organization, 2001)6. The main reason for the existence of this declaration was 
to promote a balanced interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement in a way such that it is supportive of a WTO Member’s right to protect public health 
and ensure access to medicines for all (South Centre, 2011). 
The Declaration, divided in 7 points, recognizes the gravity of public health issues afflicting 
many developing and under-developed countries, in particular those where HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other serious epidemics are causing a huge number of deaths. For this 
reason, in the Declaration, it is indicated that the provisions established in the TRIPS Agreement 
can be used with the maximum flexibilities. In addition, in point 5 of the Declaration, some 
TRIPS provisions have been better clarified. For example, WTO members has the right to grant 
compulsory licences and to determine what makes up a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency. Developed-countries are encouraged to provide incentives 
to their enterprises and institutions to transfer technologies to least-developed countries, which 
are also exempted, with regards to only pharmaceutical patents, from applying Section 5 and 7 
 
6 For the full Doha Declaration official document: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm 
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of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, until 1 January 2016 (the date has been later extended to 1 
January 2033). With the last decision, a major barrier to access to affordable medicines, for 
poor countries have been removed. 
Having described the fundamental structure of the TRIPS Agreement, from the next section, 
we will solely focus on patents, starting from a general economic theory on patent rights. 
 
1.2 Economic background on patents 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) a patent “is an exclusive 
right granted for an invention, which is a product or a process that provides, in general, a new 
way of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a problem. To get a patent, 
technical information about the invention must be disclosed to the public in a patent 
application” (WIPO, 2020).  
This definition clearly shows that it is a right (even though only a temporary right), but not a 
guarantee to exclude others from making, using, or even selling the patented property. For what 
concerns the disclosure to the public of the patent application, there are some interpretation 
differences between Europe and the USA, but it is safe to say that the disclosure should be 
viewed as broadly helpful to third parties wishing to understand the nature of innovation 
(Rockett, 2010). Patentable subject matter can vary a lot: they can be a process, a product, a 
composition of matter, a machine, or a new and useful improvement of any of these. In addition, 
in almost all the patent systems, a patent application is required to provide a significant 
innovative step. Finally, a patent right, after being granted, can be exercised, traded, sold or 
abandoned, just like all forms of property rights. 
From an economic point of view, the crucial characteristics of patents are that they function in 
conjunction with knowledge, an intangible asset, as embodied in an innovative product or 
process, and they confer monopoly rights to the inventor (Langinier & Moschini, 2002). 
Whenever there is creation new knowledge that makes the production of new products or 
processes possible, it obviously brings considerable economic value to the table, but it has 
features that make it problematic for the market system to handle it properly (Arrow, 1962). 
According to the Arrow Model, knowledge is a quintessential public goods and they are non-
rival in consumption, meaning that the consumption of a public good by one individual does 
not reduce the amount available for others. Public goods are also non-excludable, which means 
that it is not possible to prevent people from enjoying the public good once it is available. With 
these two features in mind, it is clear why a competitive system has some issues with public 
goods. Indeed, when an inventor bears all the cost of an innovation, everyone else can benefit 
from a discovery with zero costs, having an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. The 
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free-rider problem is considered undesirable within economic markets, as businesses cannot 
charge for each unit of a public good that is consumed, so that there is little incentive to produce, 
or enhance public goods (Eccleston-Turner, 2016). 
The inherent externalities associated with this class of public good generate a market failure: a 
competitive market system may be expected to provide an inefficiently low level of innovations 
(Arrow, 1962). This issue is usually addressed, in a patent system, by attacking the non-
appropriability of knowledge that lies in the hearts of this market failure. In particular, by 
allowing innovators with the possession of property rights on their inventions, patents are legal 
means of influencing the excludability attributes of such a pure public good. 
The most important economic benefits and costs of the patent system are closely related to the 
nature of the market failure that it addresses, and to the second-best character of the solution it 
provides (Rockett, 2010). Nonetheless, Arrow (1962), proposes an alternative solution: for 
optimal allocation to invention, it is necessary that the government or any other institutional 
entities that are not founded on profit-loss criteria to finance research and invention. The Arrow 
Model is based on the following five assumptions (Pompei, 2017): 
1) The underlying knowledge innovation is a pure public good; 
2) Innovation can actually reduce costs and innovate processes; 
3) With the presence of a patent system, only one firm can innovate and apply for a patent; 
4) The production process is characterized by indivisibilities and uncertainty; 
5) The technological incentive (TI) to innovate is defined as: 
𝑇𝐼 =  𝜋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜋𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
The last formula can be interpreted as the additional amount of profit that a firm can make, 
thanks to the value of the innovation. 
Consider now a monopoly situation: the firm innovates according to TI, that is the positive 
difference between the post innovation profit (blue rectangle) and the pre-innovation profit 
(orange rectangle), as show in Figure 1 below. By introducing a radical process innovation, the 
monopolistic firm not only sets the post innovation price (P’m) lower than the previous one 








Figure 1: Innovation in a monopolistic scenario (adapted from Pompei (2017)) 
 
In the opposite scenario, so in a perfectly competitive market, many firms compete with each 
other, but only one can win the innovation race and get the patent approved. Here, TI is the 
positive difference between the post innovation profit (yellow rectangle) and zero (Figure 2). 
The technology innovation of a competitive firm is large than the TI of a monopolistic one, 
because no profits were accruing to competitive firms before introducing the innovation. Since 
only one firm can get a patent, this competitive market becomes a monopolistic one after the 
successful grant of the IP right. 
 
Figure 2: Innovation in a perfect competition scenario (adapted from Pompei (2017)) 
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When the government supports innovation, through tax incentives for example a competitive 
market is guaranteed by the fact that firms sell all goods at a substantially lower cost. It is also 
impossible that any form of monopoly emerges and in definitive, the social welfare increases. 
The TI in this case is equal to the red trapezoid, and it is graphically obvious the increase in 
profit with respect to the former two cases. 
 
Figure 3: Innovation in the government incentives case (adapted from Pompei (2017)) 
 
The Arrow Model described so far, is one of the three patent system theories that have emerged 
over time. In particular, this model is based on the reward theory (the most traditional one), 
where innovation is considered a social good. Therefore, systems should be set up to reward 
innovation, and since patents perform this function, they provide exclusive rights to an 
invention for a defined period of years (Kitch, 1977). 
The primary objective in the reward theory involves discussions about incentives, and the 
policies always focus on conceiving optimal incentive structures, while reducing the social 
costs of access restriction. In this theory is the society who has to endure the reduction in social 
welfare because the innovator enjoys monopoly rents. Nonetheless, society understands that 
these rewards are essential for innovations, so it is a compromise for the greater good 
(Greenspoon & Cottle, 2011). From a different point of view, it is arguable that these rewards 
can be unjust because those who make a small innovation may obtain the same profits of a 
pioneer.  
Another theory that tries to better explain the interconnections among innovator competing with 
each other is the prospect theory (Kitch, 1977). According to this theory, a patent is a document 
that serves as a public announcement of an innovation that already has occurred. Consequently, 
the government grants the rights to the first inventor but with the open nature of the patent 
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document, actually an innovating firm signals to other firms what has already been invented. 
This incentivize others to “prospect” (e.g. to explore) in other areas, especially competitors who 
then can put their effort in fields that are not related to those inventions. A portfolio of patents 
is capable to reveal the entire direction in which an innovating firm is going (Greenspoon & 
Cottle, 2011). The more competitors continue prospecting for innovations across a range of 
ideas away from what has already been done, the more it results to further prospecting and 
perpetuation of the system. 
Dissimilarly to reward theory, the focus of the prospect theory is on the use of patents to 
minimize duplication of effort among competing innovating firms. In this case, the social 
welfare benefits are determined considering the fact that each firm goes in its own direction 
with no duplicating efforts. 
Last but not least, Commercialization theory faces the patent system subject from a different 
angle, because it focuses neither on compensating for new ideas, nor on efficiency among 
competing firms in resource allocation. Indeed, it directly looks at the effects of patent owners 
and transfer (Kieff, 2003). In this model, a patent has two characteristics: beaconing and 
bargaining. The former alerts the world on the technologies and rights that a patent incorporates, 
while the latter derives from the fact that a patent right can be transferred (Greenspoon & Cottle, 
2011). These two features work together, enabling multiple actors to communicate with each 
other and work together within a product market. 
The key characteristics of patent, in this theory, is that they can be transferred and exchanged 
due to the fact that each patent right owner can use it as she wishes. 
From the description of different patent system theory, one question it still remains an 
unanswered question: what is the economic value of a patent and how can it be valued? 
 
1.3 The economic value of patents 
For all enterprises, innovation is the crucial mean to be competitive in the markets they operate 
in, but to have an extra gear they need to protect their innovation, keeping other companies 
from using the same technologies. For this purpose, patents provide businesses with the unique 
opportunities to keep their idea locked inside their organization (even though only for a 
predetermined period). Due to the fact that patents become in this way an intangible asset to 
companies, it is important for any potential investor, to know how to calculate a patent’s value 
and understand the overall value of the company, based on it.  
Hall (2009) states that the first step is to define what “value of patents” means. We can interpret 
the value in two ways: 1) as the value of the underlying invention that the patent protects; or 2) 
as the value of the patent right, which is the private incremental value of taking out a patent. 
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The second interpretation is the incentive effect of patenting, while the former is what interests 
us from the perspective of a social welfare system, or when we use patents as indicators of 
innovative activity (Hall, 2009). 
According to Hall (2009), there are two different strategies for measuring patent’s values. The 
first strategy values a portfolio of patent held by a company, using a regression of firm market 
value on various firm characteristics (for example, tangible assets, spending in R&D and so on) 
and including a measure of the patents owned by a firm. The second strategy, on the other hand, 
values a single patent using two opposite methodologies: the former observes the patent 
owner’s willingness to pay renewal fees on the patent, the latter surveying its owner or inventor 
and attempting to elicit an estimate of its value. 
The first strategy, i.e. portfolio approach, relates the financial market valuation of a firm to its 
tangible and intangible assets. The coefficients in a regression constructed with this strategy, 
are the shadow value of the various assets in the market, and not being structural parameters, 
they vary over time and space. Financial markets will value patents both as indicator 
parameters, since they are correlated with the success of innovative activity, and as instrumental 
variables that secure returns to that activity by excluding other competitors. Portfolio 
approaches will generally measure a combination of part of the value of the underlying 
inventions and the patent rights associated with them. 
The literature on the relationship between market valuation and the firm’s patent portfolio is 
vast. It is worth starting from the observation that much of the evidence that Hall (2009) 
gathered is related to Anglo-Saxon economies plus Japan, because in those country financial 
markets are strongly developed. The results can be summarized, noting that patents are usually 
traded above and beyond the R&D done by a company and that pharmaceutical patent 
protection value is higher than other sectors. 
Measures of the quality of the portfolio, in particular the number of times a patent has received 
citations, are even more strongly associated than patents with firm market value: this reflect an 
important fact which is that most of the patents have absolutely no value, and are worthless and 
very few are worth a great deal. This fact does not mean that most are not needed or should not 
have been issued, but it suggests that the uncertainty at the time of issue of the patent rights is 
very large. 
Using renewal data to estimate the value of a patent is the best way to analyze the problem if 
we are interested in the value of obtaining a patent instead of in the value of the underlying. 
The idea behind this assumption made by Hall (2009) is that the fees for renewing a patent rises 
over time, so one can get an idea of the distribution of the value of patent coverage in a particular 
jurisdiction by looking at how many patents are renewed at different lifetimes.  
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Gambardella (2013) reviews few representative papers that try to better understand the value 
of the patented inventions, organizing them in 3 categories each of which assessing 
respectively: the value of patent rights, the value of patents as quality signals, and the value of 
patented inventions as a whole. In the last category, the focus is on the creation of value through 
the number of inventions produced rather than increase in the value of individual invention. 
 
1.4 The value of patent rights 
To be able to uncover the value of patent rights, it is fundamental to start from the idea that 
patent “lives” are an indicator of the value itself because it is very expensive to patent holders 
to renew protection of additional years. The median values from patents issued in 1970 in 
Germany, France and UK were respectively $17,239, $847 and $1861 (Schankerman & Pakes, 
1986) and since the distribution means are higher in France and the UK, it is safe to say that the 
data have a skewed nature (Gambardella, 2013). 
Studies that make use of renewal fees, rely on the fact that a considerable number of patents is 
not renewed until the end of the legal lifespan, but in this case, renewal fees only provide a 
lower bound. Bessen (2008) estimated patent rights values using US data, assuming that the 
distribution of a patent right value follows a log-normal distribution. His approach combines 
two novel ideas. One uses data on patent renewal decisions to estimate the value of holding a 
patent, so the value of a patent is revealed when its owner pays a renewal fee. The other one 
emphasizes the relationship between patent value and a variety of patent characteristics, in 
particular patent “quality. These studies look at the correlations between patent characteristics 
and variables that should be correlated with patent value. Based on such correlations, it is 
possible for researchers to estimate the value of a patent from the number of times it has been 
cited. Nevertheless, the authors of these studies recognize that the relationship between citations 
and patent value is noisy (Bessen, 2008).  
Patent fees, which are increasing over time, provide an observed lower bound for the value of 
the patent at each cutoff point in which patents need to be renewed (in the US 4,8,12 years after 
the first grant by the IP Office). Bessen (2008) then run an ordered probit regression using 
information on patents renewal (for example if they were renewed after year 4, but not after 
year 8, and so on). He finds that the patents granted to US patentees in 1991 were worth about 
$78,000 in the mean ($7000 in the median) to their owners. He estimates the ratio of patent 
value to R&D–a measure of the subsidy that patents provide to R&D investment–to being only 
about 3%. Nonetheless, the value of US patents to US owners in 1991 was more than $4 billion 
(Bessen, 2008). Not surprisingly he finds that there are sizeable differences in patent value 
across distinct groups of patentees. Small entities–individuals, small corporations, non-profit 
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organizations–have patent values are on average less than half as large as the values obtained 
by large corporations. This difference disappears in the high-tech industry where markets for 
technology work particularly well. Finally, he quantifies the association between litigation and 
patent citation statistics and patent value. Indeed, a litigated patent is worth nearly six times as 
much as non-litigated patent, and an additional patent citation received increases patent value 
by 5.5% on average (Bessen, 2008). 
Another author that investigates the value of patents using renewal fees is Serrano (2011). He 
combines information on renewals and patent trade to get an accurate estimate of the value of 
patent rights. He develops and estimates a model relying on data of transfer of patents in a 
sample of patents applied for and granted to US small firms. The fundamental assumption is 
that traded patents are worth more than just renewed patents because the owner also considers 
the gains enjoyed by the buyers who earn more than they do from patents. First, the author finds 
that the mean value of patent rights in 2003 is $164,670 for traded patent and $50,162 for non-
traded patents. Second, he finds that the volume of trade of patents accounts for almost fifty 
percent of the total value of all patents. Third, the gains from the trade of these patents represent 
more or less ten percent of the total volume of patents trade. Finally, the effect of lowering the 
costs of technology transfer by fifty percent is that the probability that a patent is traded, 
increases by six percent and the value of gains from trade rises by only ten percent (Serrano, 
2011). Compared to Bessen (2008), he finds a smaller value of patent rights, although including 
only patents owned by small firms (less than 500 employees). 
Another paper that relates with Serrano (2011), is the one from Galasso et al. (2011), where 
they study how the market for patents affects the enforcement of patent rights. Conventional 
studies associate the reallocation of patent rights through trade with comparative advantages in 
commercializing the innovation. The associated product market gains from trade should 
increase litigation risk for traded patents. Instead, the authors identify an alternative source of 
gains from trade, i.e. comparative advantage in patent enforcement, and show that this 
mechanism reduce patent litigation (Galasso, et al., 2011). 
Hall et al. (2005) and Bessen (2009) use stock market value of the patent-owning firms to 
estimate the value of patent rights. 
The first study shows that, besides R&D and simple patent counts, patent citations possess 
significant information on the market value of firms. Their findings help overcome the problem 
of the heterogeneity in the “importance” of patents that greatly undermined their use in the 
explanation of firm value or performance. They found that the marginal effect of additional 
citations per patent on market value is very high: if a company’s patents “quality” increases, so 
that on average these patents receive one additional citation, the firm’s market value would 
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increase by 3% (Hall, et al., 2005). In addition, they observed that market value is highly 
correlated with the portion of down-the-line citations that cannot be predicted, if past citations 
data are used. This confirms that the market is already aware of the value of particular 
innovations. Another interesting finding is that market value is positively correlated with the 
share of self-citations out of total citations to a firm’s patents, but such relationship weakens 
with the size of a firm’s portfolio of patents.  
The second study, from Bessen (2009), shows that the standard market value equation does not 
provide a direct approximation of the patent premium. With his model, he is able to relate the 
market value of patents with the aggregate capital stock and the present discounted value of 
firms rents. In turn, firm rents have a direct relationship with a firm’s patent portfolio, the mean 
patent rent, the firm mark-up for rents earned on the other assets of a company. Unfortunately, 
it is not possible to estimate directly the mean patent rent because patents may also account for 
higher quality of R&D, and thus are related to the other assets of a firm (Bessen, 2009). His 
estimate of the standard market value is $370,000 using US patent from 1992. 
The studies mentioned so far estimate patent premiums from the behavior of firms, but ideally 
it would be better, according to Gambardella (2013), to compare the value of a patented 
invention with and without the patent. In particular, Arora et al. (2008) develop a model in 
which they consider the predisposition of firms to patent. They calculate that, when patenting 
an invention, firms expect to earn 47% more than if they had not patented it. They also show 
that the unconditional expectation of the patent premium is negative and equal, on average, to 
40% (Arora, et al., 2008). This means that the costs of patenting for the average invention 
overcome its benefits.  
Jensen et al. (2011) use survey data on 1,790 Australian inventions to estimate the average 
patent premium, both for successfully patented and unpatented inventions. Their main results 
are that inventions protected by a patent are 38-47% more valuable than inventions without a 
patent, ceteris paribus. In addition, their calculation supports the notion that inventions 
registered to private firms are more valuable than those registered to individuals or to public 
organizations.  
Differently from other studies, where patents are more valuable in pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals areas, they found no evidence to suggest that the effect of a patent grant is different 
across technology areas (Jensen, et al., 2011). Finally, they found that the patent premium 
implies that a patent increases the value of the median invention by about A$256,000 (in 2007), 
and this value is bigger than those calculated by Bessen (2008) and Serrano (2012). This 
overestimation of the patent premium may derive from the fact that survey measures of 
invention value capture the full value of inventions rather than only the patent right value.  
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1.5 Value of patents as quality signals 
Hsu and Ziedonis (2013), study entrepreneurial-firm patents to find how they play distinctive 
roles in different competitive areas. In particular, they consider patents having two fundamental 
characteristics: a) as rights to exclude others, patents serve the already mentioned role of legal 
safeguards in product markets; and b) as quality signals, patents could also improve access and 
the terms of trade in factor input markets. They provide evidence that patents confer dual 
advantages basing their work on data from 370 venture-backed semiconductor start-ups, 
founded between 1979 and 1999. More specifically, they find that patents are more influential 
for founders lacking prior entrepreneurial success in securing initial funds from prominent 
Venture Capitalists. In addition, they find that patents induce steeper valuation adjustments in 
earlier round of VC financing and, conditioned on an IPO exit, patents play a more influential 
role in bridging information gaps with public investors when start-ups lack prominent VC 
investors. These results are not coherent with the traditional view that patents serve a singular 
objective in protecting the invention from other firms, therefore they confirm that patents can 
also be an indicator of the quality of a firm (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013). According to their 
estimation, the sample mean of pre-money evaluation is 28.5 million US dollars. With a 100% 
increase in patent application stock, the pre-money evaluation increases of 1.2 million USD. 
This enormous increase may rely on the fact that patents, during the earlier stages, provide 
stronger protection because they are the only instruments that enable firms to protect their 
inventions.  
Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) suggest also that patents are costly to get. Firms face the costs of 
information disclosure and the opportunity cost of interacting with multiple actors, and if these 
costs are high enough, they discourage lower quality firms from patenting their invention. In 
this way, patents work as quality signals. Nevertheless, on one hand, higher quality firms may 
be more concerned with revealing confidential information related to their inventions, 
especially if they could not patent those inventions. On the other hand, higher quality firms may 
have better inventive capacities which makes them easier to write new patents. Lower or 
unexperienced quality firms, instead, face the opposite situation. Finally, the value of patents 
estimated by Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) is significantly higher than the estimated value of patents' 
rights exhibited before, even though it appears that this difference is largely present in younger 
firms at the beginning of their business path. 
Another study that addressed patents as quality signals was the one from Hoenig and Henkel 
(2012). They use a conjoint-based survey among 187 European and US venture capitalists and 
investigate to what extent the decisions of venture capitalists are affected by start-up’s patents, 
research alliances, and team experience as signals of the quality of its technology. They find 
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that no signaling effect of patents regarding the start-up’s technology quality can be identified, 
neither of patent applications nor of granted patents. Instead, the presence of an R&D alliance 
seems to work as a quality signal (Hoenig & Henkel, 2012). These results challenge the 
evidence regarding the twofold role of patents from Hsu and Ziedonis (2013). They explain that 
one interpretation of their results could be that patent rights, and even more so patent 
applications, are relatively easy to get and therefore hardly a proof of technological quality. 
Even though their findings could contradict the twofold role of patents, venture capitalists might 
still draw implications from existing patents on other unobservable start-up characteristics, such 
as the know-how of the entrepreneurial team. 
Greenberg (2013) also considers the impact of intellectual property on the market for 
entrepreneurial finance. If the market for financing start-ups were efficient, the valuations of 
them by investors would be independent of whether their patents were pending or granted. 
However, she finds that asymmetric information and adverse selection both lower valuations, 
because of the interconnections between patents and firms’ values perception. Using data from 
317 Israeli technological start-ups, she shows that the granting of patents positively affects 
investors’ perceptions of firm value for early stage or young start-ups (Greenberg, 2013). This 
finding is consistent with the view that the mitigation of uncertainty about the scope of 
intellectual property protection enhances information disclosure by entrepreneurs and reduces 
asymmetric information and adverse selection in the market for entrepreneurial finance (Arrow, 
1962). In addition, patent grants are significant only for new ventures, during early financing 
rounds and in pre-revenue stages, to support the theory that patent rights are more important to 
companies that lack other mechanisms to prevent the expropriation of their ideas. These 
mechanisms become more available to firms as they mature and establish proven track records. 
This study also shows that patent grants influence start-ups’ ability to obtain financing from 
external resource providers.  
 
1.6 Value of portfolios of patented inventions 
Trajtenberg (1990) states that the use of intellectual property in economic research, specifically 
patents, has been hindered because patents vary enormously in their importance or value, so 
simple patent counts cannot be enough to be informative of innovative output. Nonetheless, he 
successfully demonstrated, with a pioneering work, that patents’ citations are correlated with 
their intrinsic economic value (Trajtenberg, 1990). 
Another study on patents’ citations is the one from Harhoff et al. (2003) where they, for the 
first time, used patent surveys to assess the economic value of patents.  The data they use in the 
paper, come from a survey of German patent-holders who assigned monetary value to 
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particularly important patents. They established that several indicators are significantly 
correlated with patent value. Among these indicators, of course citations, but also references to 
the patent literature, and positive outcomes of legal opposition. For what concerns the latter, 
the bigger is the value of the patent, the stronger will be the likelihood to be attacked. In survey-
driven studies such as this one, the authors are able to capture the full value of the patent right 
(Harhoff, et al., 2003). This is because, according to Gambardella (2013), unlike renewal fees, 
or other studies before mentioned, here the question (on the survey) asks for the minimum price 
at which the owner is willing to offer the patent to a competitor.  
A relevant study that aims to measure the economic value of patent portfolios is the one from 
Gambardella et al. (2017). The novelty of their analysis comes from the fact that they look at 
patent portfolios related to a particular invention rather than at the level of the firm as a whole. 
Their work separates the economic value of efforts directed toward an individual patented 
invention in the portfolio and the economic value of expanding the number of inventions to 
form larger portfolios. They find that the resources invested in individual inventions exhibit 
diminishing returns, and that the elasticity of value with respect to portfolio size is quite big. 
Obviously, the more effort you put in an invention, the more its technical value will increase. 
Nevertheless, from an economic point of view, these efforts are not directly linked to a much 
higher economic value. In the author’s opinion, value arises from the combination of the 
inventions’ peculiarities. The result of this is that resources invested in individual inventions 
exhibit diminishing returns, therefore firms should redirect their efforts into developing a 
valuable portfolio of patents, and as a result increasing the value of their inventions 
(Gambardella, et al., 2017). This increase may be because of stronger protection created by 
dividing an invention into separated patentable components, or because of synergies in value.  
From another perspective, the value of the portfolio can be described as the product of the 
number of patents and the average value per patent. In addition, the elasticity of value with 
respect to portfolio size is sizable shows that value rises proportionally or even more because 
the average quality does not decline (Gambardella, et al., 2017). 
After having discussed a wide range of literature on how to measure the economic value of 
patents, using few methods and theories, we will now focus our attention on the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Europe and India, and their Patent System. 
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CHAPTER TWO: PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
 
2.1 How TRIPS affects pharmaceutical patents 
During this Coronavirus pandemic, the global scientific community is demonstrating an 
incredible willingness to share knowledge of potential treatments, coordinate clinical trials, 
develop alternative models and publish immediately all their findings. In this positive and 
collaborative climate, it is really easy to forget that commercial pharmaceutical companies, for 
many years, have been privatizing and locking up the knowledge commons (Stiglitz, et al., 
2020), by extending control over life-saving drugs with the use of unnecessary patents, and by 
lobbying in opposition to the generic medicine industry. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, a patent is a property right granted by the government of a 
country to the inventor of a novel, non-obvious and useful invention. When a patent is granted, 
the owner has the right to exclude other from making, using, selling her intellectual property 
for a period of 20 years. In return, the patent holder publicly discloses their invention: this 
facilitates free use of this information when the patent expires.  
Patents work differently in different industries. In the electronics sector, patents are mostly 
shared among companies thanks to the pooling and/or cross-licensing of them. This is true for 
example for the modern smartphone industry, in which every hardware and software component 
has been patented by a different manufacturer. This sharing of technology is fundamental since 
a specific product contains many patented technologies. On the other hand, in the 
pharmaceutical, chemical, biotechnological industries, the patent most of the time is the product 
itself. Therefore, a patent is necessary to protect the effort put in the research and development, 
and clinical testing required before being able to place it in the market. Patent protection for the 
pharmaceutical products is particularly important compared to other sectors, since the 
manufacturing process is way easier to replicate by other competitors, with a fraction of the 
initial investment. The massive amount of investments needed to produce a new drug or vaccine 
means that the pharmaceutical companies redirect their effort in meeting the health needs of 
developed countries, where they can get profits. This is due to the fact that in those countries, 
patent laws are very flexible in issuing patent grants and the average wealth is high enough to 
allow most of the population to buy the medicines they need, or have a developed public health 
system in place (for example the vast majority of countries in Europe).  
Before the TRIPS Agreement entered in force, in most countries there was no patent system in 
place, or even if there was, it had very strict rules when granting patents to inventors. For what 
concerns pharmaceutical ones, there existed countries where there was absolutely no patent 
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system whatsoever in place. Also, TRIPS allowed least developed countries to abstain from to 
complying with the Agreement until 2033. Some scholars believe that the lack of patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products in these countries makes it difficult to establish research-
based industries in most of these places. For this reason, most medical research takes place in 
the public sector. The lack of any means of patenting suppresses the development of 
commercial enterprises focused on alleviating the disease burdens common to least developed 
countries. This is the approach followed, for instance, by Lehman (2003), who justify the 
existence of a flexible patent system as the main instrument to increase the capability of the 
pharmaceutical industries in developing countries, to produce drugs that can cure the local 
diseases at an acceptable cost. Also, efficient national patent laws better reward the effort of 
pharmaceutical companies which work for years to put in the market a safe drug. Therefore, the 
research and development of a firm, which is the most financial resource-consuming activity of 
a pharmaceutical company, is rewarded. While he admits that markets are morally neutral and 
work on the principal of scarcity, he states that in most cases the lack of access to the most 
innovative technologies is not a necessity (Lehman, 2003). 
However, Lehman (2003) ignores that since patents eliminate competition, they can also lead 
to high prices for medicines during the term of the patent. High prices, as well as the need for 
particular drugs, defeat the goal of providing universal access to a list of essential medicines, 
especially in low-income countries. In addition, the incentive to invest in research and 
development in order to bring alternative medicines to market may not be present when the 
market value of the innovation is insignificant. In the case of “neglected diseases” that 
essentially affect poor populations and the least developed countries, patents have failed to 
achieve their objective as instruments of innovation since both governments and the people in 
need, lack the purchasing power to create a market that justifies the necessary investment in the 
first place. Other policy instruments are required to overcome market failure and to encourage 
research and development for neglected diseases, and to stimulate local industries (Magnusson, 
2017). 
Notwithstanding the two different views on patent, the TRIPS Agreement has some provisions 
in place that make it more flexible to support the needs of the developing countries.  
For example, government may use or allow a competitor of a patent holder to use her invention 
without consent. This right of public power, commonly called “compulsory licensing”, include 
protection of the patent owner by granting them royalties if an invention is used, or being able 
to negotiate with the patent holder. In any case, this rule does not apply in situations of national 
emergency, or in public use for non-commercial purposes. This tool has been established so 
that national governments can prevent any potential abuse by patent holders and put public 
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interest first, including protecting health by guaranteeing that people have access to essential 
medicines. The latter aspect was the primary reason of existence of the 2001 “Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” mentioned in Chapter One. With the Declaration 
it was reaffirmed that “countries which does not have the capacity for domestic production of 
a needed product should be no less protected by compulsory license provisions (or indeed other 
TRIPS safeguards), nor should they face any greater procedural hurdles, compared to people 
who happen to live in countries capable of producing the product” (World Trade Organization, 
2001). Therefore, this flexibility enables governments to improve access to patented medicines 
that the inventors could make it difficult to use, by supplying small quantities or imposing a 
higher than optimal price. Because TRIPS allow compulsory licensing mainly to supply the 
National market, selling medicines to other countries is a process that can be subject to 
restriction. Consequently, this system does not support countries that do not have in place an 
efficient pharmaceutical industry and are forced to rely on imports. The World Trade 
Organization, few years after the Doha Declaration, agreed terms that allow the issue of 
compulsory licenses specifically for export, for countries that are not subject to the TRIPS 
Agreement until 2033; but this process is very complex and has never been really exploited 
(Grillon, 2017). India, among others, tried to lobby against this process. Indeed, the country has 
always been considered the “pharmacy of the developed world”, being the largest exporter of 
pharmaceutical products to the poorest countries, thanks to its affordable prices. In definitive, 
compulsory license is not enough to circumvent the strong patent system that TRIPS has 
imposed to all countries that are part of the WTO. 
Furthermore, according to a TRIPS Agreement provision, World Trade Organization’s 
members can also build a more balanced national patent system which takes into consideration 
both the patent holders and the public interests. Specifically, this concerns the definition of 
patentability, meaning how we specify the conditions that make an invention patentable. The 
Agreement states that governments can exclude specific inventions from patentability (World 
Trade Organization, 1994). As already mentioned, in order to obtain a patent, inventions must 
possess three key characteristics: they must be new, involve a creative step (i.e. non-obvious 
for a person specialized in that field) and be used for industrial application. TRIPS does not 
define clearly how those three main characteristics can be interpreted. Therefore, each country 
is free to state their interpretation of these conditions within their national laws. Going back to 
the Indian case, their patent law requires that novel forms of already existing medicines, have 
to satisfy an additional therapeutic benefit to “gain” the condition of the creative step. In this 
way, one of the major instruments that pharmaceutical companies exploit to obtain lifetime 
monopolies on their drugs, i.e. evergreening, becomes useless. 
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Countries that want to guarantee a rigorous application of the patentability conditions, must 
ensure a transparent process of investigating and granting patent rights, as well as for 
opposition. The latter allow all interested third parties (for example competitors or any other 
stakeholders) to give adequate reasons for rejecting any patent requests and for revoking already 
existing ones. Regrettably, most countries have not enforced this kind of procedures efficiently 
enough (Grillon, 2017). 
If certain conditions are met, TRIPS allow governments to provide limited exceptions to patent 
rights, for example permitting the use of a patented invention in research and academic studies 
on expiry of the patent. It also restricts the “power” of patents by granting countries the 
possibility to resort to parallel imports, which is the purchase of a product protected by a patent 
on a market other than the national one where it could be cheaper. 
Last but not least, a transitional period has been granted to poor countries classified by the UN 
as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), during which they are not required to meet TRIPS 
obligations, continuing to be part of the WTO. With regards to the pharmaceutical industry, the 
period will end the 1st of January 2033. This exemption has not been applicable to all LDCs, 
because some African countries, part of the ARIPO (African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organization) have established stronger patent system than TRIPS (Grillon, 2017). 
Nonetheless, what is happening in practice is that the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities to 
improve access to essential medicines is being hampered by the economic and political 
pressures of pharmaceutical companies, and by some developed countries such as the United 
States, Switzerland and the European Union. One recent example is the effort by both the US 
and Swiss governments to discourage Colombia from the compulsory licensing of imatinib, an 
anti-cancer drug. Countries that use mandatory licensing have had a significant price reduction 
and an increase in production of generic drugs, hence improving access to life-saving HIV 
therapies (such as Thailand and Brazil), or certain cancers (India). The ability of the countries 
to effectively uses the flexibilities depends on the economic power and the ability to withstand 
external pressures. The European Union is a powerful example of the political imbalance 
against the use of TRIPS flexibilities. Also, the United States and Japan have imposed stronger 
standards for protecting intellectual property (TRIPS+). 
In any case, the efficient use of TRIPS flexibilities is the main course of action to reach an 
equilibrium where the public health and the private interests coincide, or, at least, do not 
interfere with each other. Unfortunately, these instruments have not stopped most 
pharmaceutical companies to use mechanisms to circumvent the rules and get lifetime 
monopolies on their inventions. 
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2.2 Market manipulation 
A company willing to bring a new drug in the market must first of all develop the drug, 
determine how to produce it in large quantities consistently and prove to the national drug 
agencies that the product is safe and effective, after the conduction of rigid and appropriate 
clinical trials. Those inventions that meet all the above characteristics “win” the lottery and 
obtain the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the drug. Since inventors try to 
patent their chemical compounds early in the development cycle, some of the patent terms will 
expire way before the drug gets into the market. This is because clinical trials and all the studies 
needed to guarantee the safety and efficacy of a drug are processes that can last a decade.  
According to Feldman (2018), the average residual patent period for a new drug is 12 years, 
which is almost half the 20 years established by TRIPS but is a considerable reward, 
nonetheless. When the patent expires, a normal patent system allows generic companies to step 
into the market using that specific patent (or patent portfolio).  
Often, the generic company needs only to demonstrate bioequivalence, a term indicating that it 
does not have to show that the chemical formula is safe and effective, but just that the product 
is identical as the patented brand. In this way a company can enter the market without incurring 
the huge research and development costs needed for the first approval of the drug, hence being 
able to price the generic medicine at a much lower cost than the branded one. In addition, 
generic companies do not rely to advertising, but they depend on drug substation laws that allow 
family doctors or pharmacists to prescribe the generic and cheaper version of a brand drug 
(Feldman, 2018).  
The introduction of generics is a socially positive shock to the pharmaceutical industry. When 
the first generic enters the market the price drop is almost 20% of the monopoly price while 
with multiple generics, the prices may suffer a larger drop in the order of 80–85% (FDA, 2018). 
These issues force drug companies into trying to delay competition for as long as possible. To 
that purpose, they do all they can, starting from price increases on the drugs that are still 
patented, or to use the infamous “evergreening” mechanism.  
Evergreening is a corporate strategy that is achieved by seeking extra patents on (often small) 
variations of the original drug that can be new forms of release, new dosages, new combinations 
or variations, or alternative forms. In the pharmaceutical industry, this is referred to as “life-
cycle management”. Even if the patent is not so innovative, the company can earn more from 
the higher prices than it pays in legal fees to keep the patent alive (The Conversation, 2014). 
Kapczynski et al. (2012) study on secondary pharmaceutical patents granted between 1985 and 
2005 by the FDA shows numerical result on the “evergreening” mechanism. They call them 
“secondary patents” not because they believe that these patents are of lesser importance of 
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strength, but because they are assumed to come later in the sequence of innovation, and to offer 
less robust protection than a primary chemical compound claim. First, they show that patents 
with secondary claims are very common. Then, they find that independent secondary patents 
on average increase the duration of the nominal patent term enjoyed by drugs. When the 
secondary patents are on chemical and pharmaceutical compounds, they add on average 
between 4 to 5 years of additional nominal patent term. Patents that do not rely on 
pharmaceutical compounds hugely depend on secondary patents: here they add more or less 10 
years to the standard period (Kapczynski, et al., 2012). In addition, they demonstrate that 
independent secondary patents are not randomly distributed. Indeed, the propensity of firms to 
request secondary patents after their drug is on the market, increases over the sales distribution, 
showing that companies deliberately attempt to lengthen their monopoly. 
Other evergreening strategies involve the development of new chemical formulations, dosage 
schedules, or combinations that allow companies to request new patents (Feldman, 2018). In 
addition to the previous strategies, companies advertise extensively to move the market to the 
“new” product, pressuring doctors to write the new medicines or ultimately removing the old 
drug from the market. These procedures, of course, do not allow pharmaceutical firms to 
continue enjoying the patents’ benefits but somehow are forms of market manipulation, so they 
will still continue having buyers that do not shift to the generic versions.  
The most notorious evergreening technique is applying for new patents. There are very few 
patent law systems in the World that really challenge the actual validity of the patents, and 
litigation is an expensive and lengthy process for a generic company to go through. Companies 
that are able to obtain new patents on slightly modified inventions, minimize not only the 
damage they would have incurred if they were pushed out from their monopoly, but they can 
even eradicate the issue of being on the edge at all. 
In definitive, even though it is safe to assume that competitors will enter the market after a 
pharmaceutical patent expires, in reality this rarely happens at all. A significant number of 
strategies and possibilities exist, so that companies can exploit them to extend their protection 
and increase, indefinitely, the period of market monopoly for their drugs.  
Feldman (2018) demonstrate, using US patents data from 2005 to 2015, that the pharmaceutical 
industry has strayed far from how the patent systems’ have been designed by the legislators. 
First, he finds that almost 80% of the drugs associated with new patents in the FDA’s records, 
were not new-coming drugs on the market, but instead already existing ones. Second, among 
the 100-best-selling drug in the US, over 70% extended their protection one time, and 50% 
more than once. Last, almost 40% of all drugs present in the market created additional entrance 
barrier to continue enjoying the monopoly (Feldman, 2018). 
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2.3 The GLIVEC case 
 
On the 1st April 2013, the Indian Supreme Court delivered a verdict that affected the national 
and global conversation about patents. They denied the request from one of the biggest and 
powerful pharmaceutical companies, the swiss Novartis, to grant a patent on a slightly modified 
form of an important cancer curing drug, Glivec. The verdict of the Supreme Court determined 
a historical win for the access to medicines movement for patients in lower income countries. 
For the first time in history, the universal health right of the population has been put at the first 
place, protecting at the same time the local pharmaceutical industry that is specialized in the 
production of generic drugs. Indeed, India is the biggest exporter of generic products to the 
poorest countries in the world, who in this way can afford medicines that otherwise would be 
inaccessible to them because of the high prices that big pharmaceutical companies impose on 
patent-protected drugs.  
In Italy, in 2017, the price of a box of 120 Glivec pills was 1.800 Euro, valid for a month of 
treatment. Hence, the yearly cost for a patient was almost 22.000 Euro (Arletti & Bocci, 2017). 
The generic version of the same drug, instead, costed at the time 50 Euro a month. 
Given the ability of India to produce large quantities of safely produced medicines at affordable 
prices, India is known as the “Pharmacy of the Developing World”, since it has become the 
biggest supplier of generic drugs in many poor countries (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2005). 
Thanks to India’s generic industry, the standard treatment for AIDS, the so called “triple 
therapy”, that costed patients in the developed countries a staggering amount of 20.000 USD 
per year, was made available at less than 200 USD per year few years ago. 
Since 2005, all developed or developing countries part of the WTO, like India, has been obliged 
pursuant of the TRIPS Agreement, to establish an efficient patent law system in line with global 
standards. India, with its Patent Act of 1970, has been one of the few countries in the world, in 
where to get a patent you had to follow a rigorous procedure. Consequently, this has presented 
the country a numerous amount of legal cases that challenged the position of India as the 
pharmacy of the third world.  
Novartis was among the companies that appealed to the Supreme Court to obtain a patent on a 
modified version of its cancer drug, Glivec. Studies have shown that Glivec (or better, the 
chemical compound from which it derives) is the most effective existent interferon therapy 
(Lee, 2008) but it does not cure cancer permanently since it only stalls its progress. This means 
that a patient has to take the drugs during her lifetime. As almost 70% of the Indian population 
lives on less than 2 USD per day (Lee, 2008), the pricing of medicines, especially the life-
saving ones are crucial. The difference in prices between the generic and the brand drug is quite 
impressing, as previously mentioned. For this reason, in 2006, the Indian Patent Office rejected 
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Novartis’ patent application for Glivec under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, pointing 
out that the company was trying to use the “evergreening” strategy to extend its monopoly on 
the drug (to patent or not to patent).  
Gabble and Kohler (2014), reviewed the history of the attempts of Novartis to file patents in 
India for Glivec. They found that in 1993, Novartis filed patents worldwide for the imatinib 
pharmaceutical compound (that they later called Glivec) but they could not request it in India, 
as the country did not grant patents to products at the time. Novartis tried again in 1997 when 
they completed the product and made it marketable, and India accepted the patent application 
under the “mailbox” provisions, a scheme which allowed companies to request patents in India 
while the country was transitioning to the TRIPS Agreement system. During that period, Indian 
generics companies were producing the same version of the drug at a tenth of its original cost, 
so this market pressure forced Novartis to turn to the Indian Government and request a stand 
on the matter. The Indian Government therefore granted the company exclusive selling rights 
while their application came up for review. This decision blocked the generic industry that was 
producing the medicine, and resulted in a protest, led by the non-profit Cancer Patients Aid 
Association (CPAA) and the subsequent filing of opposition against the company’s patent 
application. In 2006 the Indian Patent Office finally rejected the patent, citing that it did not 
demonstrate any significant changes with respect to its previous form, which were already 
patented outside India (Gabble & Kohler, 2014). Novartis attempted several times to overturn 
the decision of the Supreme Court and the Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act. The final 
decision, in 2013, confirmed the previous stands against the grant of the patent to Novartis, 
putting the protection of the public health as the primary reason for the reject.  
According to Novartis, the requirement under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act which 
introduced “a new efficacy enhancement hurdle” (Novartis, 2009) for patenting new forms of 
known compounds, should not have been applicable to Glivec, since it has “changed the lives 
of patients with rare cancers” being “one of the major medical breakthroughs of the 20th 
century”. In their opinion, the patent they requested was necessary because the previous 
chemical compound was only the first step in the process to develop Glivec as a viable treatment 
for cancer. They justified their request stating that the R&D, which took years, created more 
than just an incremental improvement. The outcome of the Glivec case would not have hindered 
the supply of essential medicines, they pointed out, since international trade rules include 
safeguards to ensure patient access. Novartis stated that they recognized the contribution of 
generics to improving public health once drug patents expire, but also that many patients need 
further help to gain access to the medicines they need. The company designed few programs to 
help under-developed countries to afford their medicines, especially in India. Finally, Novartis 
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issued a rather colorful statement according to which the result of the Glivec case would have 
set an industry precedent as to whether pharmaceutical companies would have been able to 
invest in R&D in innovative medicines for India and will have determined whether or not 
innovation will be fostered considering India’s intellectual property laws. India’s effort to 
safeguard public health interests by denying Novartis the patent would have comprised the 
system that helps to create new lifesaving medicines for the people in need.  
From the Indian Government point of view, Glivec should have been rejected because the 
modified version of the drug did not represent a significant change in effectiveness with respect 
to its previous version. India’s Section 3(d) ban the evergreening practice in order to protect 
access to medicines for its population. Also, the programs created by Novartis to grant discounts 
to people in lower-income countries were still insufficient since the generic versions were still 
way more affordable. In addition, the 2001 Doha Declaration justified the reject of the patent 
since “the TRIPS Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO Members’ rights to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all” (World Trade Organization, 2001). Therefore, the appeal brought 
by Novartis were actually not valid from the beginning, since Indian patent laws are indeed 
constitutional and TRIPS complying, contrary to the company’s claims.  
The final decision of the Supreme Court, that made the new Glivec molecule definitively not 
patentable, agreed with the Government stands. The verdict confirmed the right of India’s 
Parliament to implement the measures that were included in the TRIPS Agreement with regards 
to public health safeguards. Furthermore, the decision repositioned India as one of the biggest 
producers of affordable medicines and reaffirmed its continuity as the “Pharmacy of the third 
world”. Also, the outcome has functioned as a model to other developing countries, directly 
affecting for example Argentina and The Philippines, that adopted similar provision as the one 
contained in the Section 3(d) of the Indian patents laws (Chatterjee, 2013). Médecins Sans 
Frontières commented that the decision was a tremendous relief for millions of patents and 
doctors in poor countries who depend on affordable medicines from India, and for treatment 
providers such as MSF. The International president of MSF at the time, Dr. Unni Karunakara, 
stated that “The [Indian] Supreme Court’s decision now makes patents on the medicines that 
we desperately need less likely. This marks the strongest possible signal to Novartis and other 
multinational pharmaceutical companies that they should stop seeking to attack the Indian 
patent law”7. 
 
7 Full interview available at: https://www.msf.org/indian-supreme-court-delivers-verdict-novartis-case 
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The Glivec case is an important precedent for the fight on access to medicines, by putting the 
public right above the interests of a powerful pharmaceutical company, while at the same time 
following the laws.  
 
2.4 Pharmaceutical industry and patent laws: Europe vs India 
 
The principal objective of this thesis is to determine whether the Indian Patent system can set 
an example, a better one, for other countries, in particular the developed ones, with regard to 
access to medicines. We want to understand whether it is fair that pharmaceutical companies 
exploit more “passive” Patent Laws, such as those present in Europe, to get lifetime monopoly 
on their drugs. We also want to assess the Indian Patent system to determine its applicability 
on European laws, specifically regarding the Section 3(d) mentioned beforehand. Ultimately, 
we would like to verify if the main justification that companies make about the high prices 
applied for patented medicines, i.e. high prices are proportional to high R&D costs, are actually 
verified empirically. Of course, we know that obtaining Research and Development data, in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical area, is very difficult because of the high sensibility of the data. 
Therefore, a lot of the work will involve using unique sources for the data gathering. To answer 
the above questions, we will begin by comparing the pharmaceutical industry in Europe with 
the one in India, and then studying the patent laws of the two sides. 
 
2.4.1 Pharmaceutical industry in Europe 
The following table is re-elaborated from EFPIA8 (2020), indicating the key data on the 
European Pharmaceutical industry during the last 20 years. 
Table 1: Pharmaceutical industry in Europe. Values in millions of Euro unless otherwise indicated (source: EFPIA) 
INDUSTRY 2000 2010 2018 
Production 127,504 199,730 259,857 
Exports 90,935 276,357 435,300 
Imports 68,841 204,824 313,269 
Trade balance 22,094 71,533 122,031 
R&D expenditure 17,849 27,920 36,312 
N° of employed 554,186 670,088 793,111 
N° of employed in 
R&D 
88,397 116,253 115,792 
 
8 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) represents the biopharmaceutical industry 
operating in Europe. Currently it represents 36 National Associations and 39 leading pharmaceutical companies, and an 
important number of small and medium-sized enterprises.  
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In 2018, in Europe the costs in research and development were about 36 billion of euros and 
the total number of employed in the sector was 793 thousand people. Nevertheless, according 
to the EFPIA (2020) report, the sector has been hit, besides the additional regulatory hurdles 
and increasing R&D costs, also by the impact of fiscal austerity measures imposed by European 
governments since 2008. During the period 2014-2019, the main emerging markets, i.e. Brazil, 
China and India, grew respectively by 11.2%, 6.9% and 11.1%, while the top five European 
markets (Italy, Germany, France, Spain and United Kingdom), in conjunction, grew only by 
5%. 
The following table, instead, depicts each European country’s spending in R&D in 2018.  
Table 2: European countries’ spending in R&D in 2018. Data in millions of Euros (source: EFPIA) 
Austria 278 Latvia n.a. 
Belgium 3,570 Lithuania n.a. 
Bulgaria 91 Malta n.a. 
Croatia 40 Netherlands 642 
Cyprus 85 Norway 126 
Czech Republic 36 Poland 356 
Denmark 1,629 Portugal 116 
Estonia n.a. Romania 80 
Finland 216 Russia 944 
France 4,451 Slovakia n.a. 
Germany 7,815 Slovenia 180 
Greece 51 Spain 1,147 
Hungary 242 Sweden 1,104 
Iceland n.a. Switzerland 6,010 
Ireland 305 Turkey 103 
Italy 1,650 United Kingdom 5,045 
TOTAL  36,312 
 
Unsurprisingly, the countries that spend most in Europe are the ones that have the biggest GDP, 
being Germany, United Kingdom and France. Also, as expected, Switzerland, being home of 
few of the largest pharmaceutical super-powers of the world, has the second largest spending 
in Europe after Germany. The exception among the data is represented by Belgium. 
Putting in perspective the previous data, during the last ten years in the US the growth in R&D 
expenditures has always been higher compared to Europe. In addition, Europe is facing 
30 
increasing competition from emerging and rapidly growing economies, so the geographical 
balance of the pharmaceutical market, and consequently the R&D, will probably shift towards 
those countries (EFPIA, 2020). 
Notwithstanding, the spending in R&D actually does not reflect the actual production of 
pharmaceuticals in Europe, as shown in the following table showing the production of each 
country in 2018. 
Table 3: European countries’ production of drugs in 2018. Data in millions of Euros (source: EFPIA) 
Austria 2,775 Latvia 157 
Belgium 13,312 Lithuania n.a. 
Bulgaria 131 Malta n.a. 
Croatia 588 Netherlands 6,180 
Cyprus 180 Norway 1,072 
Czech Republic 858 Poland 2,456 
Denmark 14,391 Portugal 1,514 
Estonia n.a. Romania 655 
Finland 1,773 Russia 4,537 
France 23,213 Slovakia 356 
Germany 32,905 Slovenia 2,010 
Greece 996 Spain 14,970 
Hungary 3,284 Sweden 8,153 
Iceland 89 Switzerland 45,885 
Ireland 19,305 Turkey 2,874 
Italy 32,200 United Kingdom 23,039 
TOTAL  259,857 
 
Comparing table 2, with table 3, it seems that there are countries, such as Italy, that even if they 
do not spend a huge amount of resources in research and development, they obtain revenue on 
the selling of medicines for almost 30 times than the costs they incurred in R&D. Noting this 
peculiarity, it is interesting to find out the R&D to the sales ratio for all countries, as shown by 
the following table. 
Table 4: R&D to total sales ratio for European countries in 2018. (source: elaborated from EFPIA) 
Austria 10.02% Latvia n.a. 
Belgium 26,82% Lithuania n.a. 
Bulgaria 69,47% Malta n.a. 
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Croatia 6,80% Netherlands 10,39% 
Cyprus 47,22% Norway 11,75% 
Czech Republic 4,20% Poland 14,50% 
Denmark 11,32% Portugal 7,66% 
Estonia n.a. Romania 12,21% 
Finland 12,18% Russia 20,81% 
France 19,17% Slovakia n.a. 
Germany 23,75% Slovenia 8,96% 
Greece 5,12% Spain 7,66% 
Hungary 7,37% Sweden 13,54% 
Iceland n.a. Switzerland 13,10% 
Ireland 1,58% Turkey 3,58% 
Italy 5,12% United Kingdom 21,90% 
 
Interestingly, Bulgaria and Cyprus, two of the smallest economies in Europe, spend respectively 
70% and 47% in R&D with respect to their pharmaceutical production. On the other hand, more 
powerful economies, such as Italy and Ireland, have a very low spending in research and 
development. It is also worth noting that Switzerland, being one of the leading countries in the 
research area, is more than able to make up its costs. 
Moving on the generics data, the following figure indicates the share accounted for by generics 
in pharmaceutical market sales (at ex-factory prices). 
 






























































































































There are only 5 countries that sell over 50% of their production in the generic market, with 
Italy being the biggest one. Surprisingly, the second largest producer of medicines in Europe, 
Switzerland, sells only 13% of their total production in the generic market.  
Last but not least, it is interesting analyzing the trade balance on pharmaceuticals. The following 
table shows the difference between the exports and the imports of all countries part of EFPIA. 
Table 5: Trade balance of pharmaceutical drugs in Europe in 2018. Data in millions of Euros (source: Eurostat COMEXT) 
Austria 327 Lithuania -288 
Belgium 6,632 Luxembourg -207 
Bulgaria -451 Malta 43 
Croatia -242 Netherlands 13,374 
Cyprus 48 Norway -1,232 
Czech Republic -1,905 Poland -3,295 
Denmark 9,469 Portugal -1,656 
Estonia -402 Romania -2,297 
Finland -1,233 Russia -9,854 
France 4,619 Slovakia -1,325 
Germany 33,211 Slovenia 1,359 
Greece -1,734 Spain -3,610 
Hungary 847 Sweden 4,017 
Ireland 34,236 Switzerland 47,027 
Italy -657 Turkey -3,007 
Latvia -151 United Kingdom 368 
 
It is no surprise that Germany and Switzerland have a very high positive trade balance. Instead, 
countries that do not have a relevant pharmaceutical industry are more dependent on exports, 
and therefore present negative trade balances. 
In definitive, the industry in Europe is quite diversified, and very much dependent on the 
specific country part of EFPIA. It is interesting that there are small economies, such the 
Bulgarian one, that invests a lot in R&D if compared to their total sales. Furthermore, the 
generic industry is not quite developed in Europe, with few exceptions from Italy, which 
generics sales represent over 60% of its market. Finally, a country like Switzerland, a leader in 
the pharmaceutical sector, is one of the biggest spenders in R&D but is more than able to make 




2.4.2 Pharmaceutical industry in India 
The Indian pharmaceuticals market has unique characteristics according to the McKinsey 
(2020) report on India Pharma. First, the generics dominate, making up for 75% of the retail 
market. Then, local companies have enjoyed a primary position driven mainly by early 
investments in the sector and production capabilities. Second, the high competition lowers the 
prices. The Indian industry ranks tenth in terms of value, globally, however it is ranked third in 
volumes. These characteristics present both opportunities and challenges (McKinsey, 2020). 
Also, India is still the largest provider of generic drugs in the world, as it provides over 50% of 
the global demand for various vaccines, 40% of generic demand in the US and 25% of all 
medicine demand in the UK (IBEF, 2020). Currently, over 80% of the antiretroviral drugs used 
to combat HIV are coming from Indian pharmaceutical firms. In addition, Indian generics 
account for 20% of the global export in terms of selling volume. 
In the last 5 years (2015-2019) the market size grew by almost 5 billion, as shown in the figure 
below, with an average yearly growth rate of 7.73%. 
 
Figure 5: Market size in India in the last 5 years, in millions of USD (source: IBEF) 
The exports industry also grew up during the same period, however not following a similar 
pattern in terms of growth rate, as suggested by the following figure which shows a small 
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Figure 6: Pharmaceutical exports in the last 5 years, in millions of USD (source: IBEF) 
The generic industry, as mentioned beforehand, is the most relevant component of the entire 
Indian pharmaceutical industry. Many experts throughout the world questioned the role of India 
as the “Pharmacy of the third world” trying to understand whether Indian generics were as 
effective as those manufactured in the US or in Europe. The Telegraph (2020) interviewed Dr. 
Arindam Basu, professor of epidemiology at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand who 
believes that, as all medicines are expected to go through the process of quality control and 
evaluation by drug regulators, such as the FDA, it seems reasonable to expect that generic drugs 
produced in India have the same efficacy of the American and European counterparts.  
Currently, according to a report from Global Business (2020), the generic landscape is rapidly 
changing, being affected by cost pressures in the domestic environment, pricing pressures in 
developed markets (Europe and USA), as well as pricing hurdles introduced in India. Finally, 
regulatory authorities are demanding stricter compliance, increasing also the costs for the 
approvals needed to put the drugs in the market.  
Having understood the difference between the European and Indian pharmaceutical products 
markets, we will now study the patent systems that are currently in place in those areas. 
 
2.4.3 European Patent System 
The current European Patent System (EPS) has consisted of National Offices (NPOs) and the 
European Patent Office (EPO) since 1978. The rules governing the system have changed 
administratively, legally and judicially in the last 40 years.  
The EPO is the crucial point of reference for patent applicants, as it offers a service of one-stop-
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gets the patent through the EPO, they must then validate (which is a much faster procedure with 
respect to the applying) the patent with each National systems (NPOs) in which they want the 
patent to take effect. As an alternative, firms can submit their applications directly to each 
National system. In any case, submitting an application to the European Patent System is more 
efficient because a patent granted by the EPO is much more likely to be successfully validated 
by the NPOs. Indeed, the primary advantage that companies exploit thanks to the EPO is a 
reduction of costs when getting a granted patent (Graevenitz & Garanasvili, 2018). On the other 
hand, using this procedure means carrying the risk of a rejection by the EPO. It could happen 
that EPO may reject an application while one or more NPOs would not.  
In practice, Graevenitz and Garanasvili (2018) find that applicants request the patent to one 
NPO, and then apply to the EPO, to mitigate the risk of reject by the patent offices. The 
following table shows the number of applications and the patents that were actually granted by 
the EPO during the last ten years. It appears that the number of applications has been consistent 
during the period in the exam, but the number of granted patents has increased more or less 
every year, with an increase of over a thousand of granted patents from 2010 to 2019. However, 
it is interesting to note that the difference between the number of applications in 2010 and 2019 
was actually much lower than the difference between the granted patents in those years. 
 
Figure 7: Pharmaceutical patents applications vs granted patents by EPO in 2010-2019 (source: adapted from EPO database) 
The patenting process in Europe requires that the patent must possess the three characteristics 
already established by the TRIPS Agreement. For the EPO, an invention is patentable only if it 
is: new and previously undisclosed; distinguished by an inventive step not obvious to someone 
expert in that technology; capable of industrial application. Nevertheless, there are a few 
peculiarities in the EPO, for example, a computer software can only be protected by copyright 
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There are 8 stages in the process for obtaining a successfully granted patent through the 
European Patent Office (EPO, 2011). First of all, the applicant must contact a patent attorney 
who will be able to provide more efficiently the documentation to the EPO. The documentation 
includes the formally written request, the details of the applicant, the description of the 
invention, etc. If the documentation is correct, the application is given a filing date (also called 
priority date). After this date, an initial examination begins. Next, a search report is sent to the 
applicant, listing and including copies of all prior art documents found by an experienced 
examiner and relevant to the invention in exam. The patent application is officially published 
after 18 months from the filing date. This means that the invention will be accessible to other 
people since it will be published in an open database. It will act as prior art against any future 
patent applications from other inventors or companies for similar inventions. The applicant has 
then 6 further months to decide whether to continue the application and if so, the countries 
which she wants to include in the patent protection. Accepting the continuation of the process 
means also being subject to the so called “substantive examination”, which represents the next 
stage. Here the EPO has to decide if the invention and the application both meet the 
requirements of the European Patent Convention9. This is the crucial stage where the patent is 
evaluated by three EPO examiners for maximum objectivity, who interact directly with the 
patent attorney to discuss the feasibility of the patent and to discuss changes in the application. 
The sixth stage is the decision to grant the patent, after the approval of the examiners and the 
payment of all the fees. If it is granted, the patent officially takes effect from the date of 
publication. Following the grant by the EPO, the applicant has to validate the patent in each 
designated state within a specific time limit. 
The patent may be opposed by third parties, if they think that the patent should not have been 
granted. The opposition can be filed during the 9 months following the publication of the patent 
in the European Patent Bulletin. This opposition stage is the ultimate resource of an opponent 
(usually a competitor) to attack a European patent as a single entity in a single forum. Indeed, 
after that period, the patent can only be challenged in national courts which ruling of course are 
independent of each other. 
Currently, according to the EPO10, it costs on average 6,100 Euro to take a patent application 
through the grant stage. This, of course, does not include the fees that an applicant may have to 
 
9 The European Patent Convention (EPC), dated 5 October 1973, is a multilateral treaty instituting the EPO and 
providing and autonomous legal system according to which European patents are granted. This convention 
basically represents the underlying framework to the current European patent system and includes not only the 
countries part of the European Union, but all European Countries, excluding Finland, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, 
for a total of 38 countries. 
10 Price source: https://www.epo.org/service-support/faq/own-file.html#faq-199 
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pay in addition, in some countries that requires a “complete” validation of the patent which 
requires a refiling of the patent and also the translation of the whole patent documentation.  
The fundamental characteristic of the current patent system is that it enables inventor to get 
broad and uniform territorial protection in the participating Member States, with substantial 
costs reduction. A company that wants to patent its invention in more than one country, it just 
has to validate the patent in those countries rather than having to file individual applications. A 
validation process is much faster than applying for a patent in every country, and of course the 
fees are also much lower.  
On the other hand, many companies believe that the current system’s requirements to validate 
the granted European patent in every country separately is a real disadvantage. In a Finnish 
survey from the Confederation of Finnish Industries (2014), few companies replied that the 
European Patent System makes little sense as a concept, if the patent needs to be validated in 
each country separately, having to pay the validation fees in each country. Another perceived 
weakness of the EPS is that the registration of changes of the ownership after the grant of the 
patent cannot be done centrally by the EPO but must be made in each country separately.  
The weaknesses of the current patent system could be solved by the new Unitary Patent system 
that is expected to start at the beginning of 2022. From 2012 to 2014, there have been significant 
developments in the implementation of the so-called “EU Patent Package” (Regulation No. 
1257/2012) and the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court.  
The Unitary Patent package will sit alongside the system currently in place and will provide a 
single pan-European patent and a single court for litigation of European patents (Roberts & 
Venner, 2014). The process of applying for a European patent, the examination of the patent 
application by the EPO, and the EPO granting process will remain unchanged under the new 
regime. The substantial difference is that it will be possible to get patent protection in up to 25 
EU Member States by submitting a single request to the EPO. After a patent is granted, the 
patent holder will be able to request unitary effect, thereby getting a Unitary Patent which will 
provide uniform patent protection in up to 25 EU Member States (EPO, 2020).  
Today, an inventor can protect an invention via a national patent or a European patent, however 
each granted patent must be validated and maintained individually in each country where they 
take effect. This is a complex and very costly process, as already mentioned, so the Unitary 
Patents will remove these kinds of issues. For example, no additional fees will be due for filing 
and examination of the request for unitary effect or for registration a Unitary Patent. 
With the official implementation of the Unitary System, it is uncertain whether it will be easier 
for pharmaceutical companies to make use of the evergreening strategies described before, but 
considering the simplification of the process, it is more likely to happen.   
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2.4.4 Indian Patent System 
The current patent law in India is governed by the Patents Act that entered into force in 1970 
and was later amended in 2003, with the Patent Rules, and in 2005 with the Amendment to the 
Patents Act. The former is regularly amended in consonance with the changing environment, 
most recent being in 2016. 
The patentability criteria under the Act are the same as the European System, as also India is 
part of the WTO, so are subject to the TRIPS Agreement (that was officially implemented in 
2005 in India). However, the Indian System has different interpretations for some of the criteria. 
Indeed, the System requires that the invention is new (novel) and useful (industrial 
applicability), but non-obviousness (inventive step) is much stricter, contrary to the practice of 
patent laws in the vast majorities of the developed countries. It is worth noting that this 
peculiarity is also the instrument that allows the opposition and the revocation of patents under 
the Act. Also, in India, chemical and pharmaceutical inventions were only given process 
patents, but in 2005, to become compliant to TRIPS, the Amendment reinstated product patents 
and made the reverse-engineering or copying of patented drugs without requisite licensing from 
the patent holder illegal. Even though TRIPS forced India to transform its existing patent laws 
with the Doha Declaration, the country reserved the right to invoke compulsory licensing to 
fight the abuse of patent privileges. Most importantly, India inserted Section 3(d) into its 
amended law that made the patenting process a bit more difficult, particularly with regard to 
incremental innovation. Indeed, it is required that that an applicant has to demonstrate enhanced 
efficacy to the previously known substance to be considered a new invention (Khanna & Singh, 
2015). The Section was specifically intended to protect consumers from the pharmaceutical 
companies that extended the patents on their drugs to enjoy lifetime monopolies.   
When Section 3(d) was introduced, it was both unprecedented and unique among the world’s 
existing patent regimes and was welcomed with a lot of skepticism by the developed countries. 
Nonetheless, a significant number of scholars and legal experts, after conducting independent 
assessments of the Indian patents law, have found that Section 3(d) was indeed compliant with 
the TRIPS Agreement.  
The crucial requirement of “enhanced efficacy” established by the Section 3(d), according to 
Khanna and Singh (2015), are to be interpreted as a refinement of the “inventive step” and 
“industrial applicability” rather than a separate requirement. Another critic moved toward the 
Section 3(d) is that setting such high standards to patent inventions, discourages innovation and 
more in general, research and development. Notwithstanding all the criticisms, in a report from 
the Indian Pharmaceutical alliance, it has been shown that a list of 86 drugs that entailed 
relatively small changes over already existing compounds, have been able to demonstrate 
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successfully enhanced efficacy over the previous formulation, therefore obtaining patents in 
India (Khanna & Singh, 2015). Even though the report refers to data up to 2010, it is evident 
that it is not impossible to show the requirement of Section 3(d). 
The following table compares the number of pharmaceutical patent applications and the patents 
actually granted, for the period 2008-2017. The number of patents that have been granted, 
compared to the number of applications presented to the Indian Patent Office, has been much 
lower. It appears obvious how the Indian patent laws are actually very strict in approving 
patents, with an average ratio between approved and filed of only 17.9%, meaning that less than 
¼ of pharmaceutical patents applications are being granted each year. Furthermore, in the last 
few years, while the number of applications has always been more or less constant, it appears 
that the number of approved patents is increasing. This trend has also been present in the 
European figures shown previously. 
 
 
Figure 8: Pharmaceutical patents applications vs granted patents by IPO in 2008-2017 (source: adapted from IPO annual 
reports) 
To get a patent approved in India, an applicant has to follow a predefined procedure, not very 
different from the one that is currently in force in Europe (with the EPO). Here, the starting 
point is to decide whether to apply for a patent personally or take help from registered agents 
(the latter is recommended) (IPTSE, 2019).  
First, an inventor, or the delegated party, has to draft a patent application and needs to fill Indian 
Patent Application Form 1. The application should include clauses such as usability and 
outcome of the invention in details and any intention to license or profiting from the invention. 
After the first stage, the patentee can officially file the application, which needs to be submitted 
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published in an official patent journal after a period of 18 months, unless the inventor does not 
submit a specific form, requesting an earlier publication. Before a patent is granted, it is 
scrutinized to determine its merits. This is not an automatic process since the applicant needs 
to request the examination formally, by submitting a form; then, the patent office queues the 
application for examination, with no fixed date. After the review of the application, a first 
examination report is completed by the examiner, indicating a detailed list of objections. 
Depending on the severity of the objections, the application process can delay of another 6-9 
months (IPTSE, 2019). Once the examiner finds no objection whatsoever, the patent is granted 
and then published in the official gazette of the Indian Patent Office, with a protection period 
of 20 years from the date the patent was first filed. 
One peculiarity of the Indian system is that the opposition process is rather effective, as it admits 
both pre-grant opposition and also post-grant opposition. The former can be filed by any party 
interested within six months from the date of the publication of the application in the official 
patent journal and not fees are required. For what concerns the post-grant opposition, it can be 
filed within twelve months from the date of publication of the grant of a patent in the official 
gazette of the patent office. 
Without considering the annual fees that an inventor has to pay to renew the patent every year, 
the average cost for successfully getting the grant of a patent varies depending whether you are 
an individual, a small enterprise, or a large company. Considering as a baseline a small entity, 
the average cost if you apply for the grant directly and if you take help from experts, are 
respectively 160 Euros and 1160 Euros11. The costs can increase a lot if you are a large 
enterprise, with a maximum costs 2205 Euro, if you are both a large company and you 
subcontracted the filing of the application to a law firm. 
The Indian patenting process, in conclusion, is rather complicated and involve almost 30 forms 
that you have to fill-out depending on the specific application and the needs of the applicant. In 
any case, even if the costs for patenting may seem much lower if compared to the European 
patents, the opportunity-costs are not so immediate. Indeed, in Europe you pay a higher fee, but 
the process itself is much more straightforward to complete. In addition, the process will 
become more efficient with the introduction of the Unitary Patent which will allow an inventor 
to request a patent in almost all countries in the European Union, with only one application. On 
the other side, requesting a patent in India, from the perspective of a foreign company, for 
example, a pharmaceutical company, is rather inexpensive, but the process itself is tribulated 
by the many technicalities of the Patents Act. Often, a pharmaceutical company is unable to get 
 
11 Prices source: https://www.zatalyst.com/cost-patent-registration-india/ 
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a patent, even if it that had no problem getting it approved in other countries (the Glivec case 
discussed previously is a significant example in that aspect). 
Having understood the differences in the European and Indian model, in the next chapter we 
will try to understand whether the Indian patent system can be an example for the European 
one. In particular it will be interesting to study if the Indian system can be applied to a more 
developed economy, and if the balance between public and private interest will be maintained. 
In addition, the main justification for the existence of patents is that they stimulate research 
because they protect inventions, allowing inventors to enjoy an established term of exclusive 
monopoly, to recover the costs of the research. However, is this true for pharmaceutical 
companies that strategically patent minor variations of already existing medicine, to maintain a 
monopoly in the market? We will try to focus our attention on the debate on research and 
development and patenting strategies. 
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CHAPTER THREE: R&D AND PATENTS 
 
3.1 Innovation and access to medicines 
Pharmaceutical companies’ main justification on their continuous patent protection requests is 
the enormous amount of efforts and economic resources dedicated in developing the 
formulation needed to put a new or a modified drug in the market. In addition, the process of 
creation and marketing is of course long, costly and sometimes perilous. Therefore, patents, 
and other intellectual property protections, are thought to be an adequate reward that at the same 
time stimulates innovation and bring profits to companies. Notwithstanding, for pharmaceutical 
firms to have an incentive to continue investing in research and development, they must have 
an expectation that they can charge prices high enough to recover the R&D costs and still being 
able to make a profit. According to Grabowski et al. (2015) the main rationale for intellectual 
patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry, and generally for technology-driven 
industries, is that the long-term benefits that companies bring with continued future innovation 
outweigh the short-term monopoly that the protection results in. 
DiMasi et al. (2016) find that the research and development processes often take over 10 years 
to complete and a new drug approval in the US involves more than a billion dollars in out-of-
pocket costs. Furthermore, only one in eight drug candidates survives the approval process 
(DiMasi, et al., 2016). As a result, the high risk of failures, together with the vast amount of 
costs, mean that R&D expenditure must be funded by the new market-approved products. 
Without a patent system, it can be argued that the incentive to follow such a laborious process 
would disappear. Indeed, Mansfield (1986) found that, when there is no patent protection 
system, 60% of pharmaceutical inventions would not have been developed and 65% would not 
have been commercialized. Since the time of the study, efficient patent systems have been 
created all over the world, with TRIPS becoming a compulsory requirement to being part of the 
World Trade Organization. Consequently, it is rather safe to assume that the percentages found 
by Mansfield (1986) would be higher if the study was to be conducted now. 
Finally, patents are also fundamental for start-up firms, often financed by venture capital. The 
value of these new companies is determined mainly by their proprietary technologies and the 
drug formulations they have under development. Hence, the existence of intellectual property 
protection plays a key role in funding and partnership opportunities for such firms (Grabowski, 
et al., 2015). Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) provide evidence that patenting positively affects 
investors’ perceptions of start-up quality across multiple stages of the entrepreneurial life cycle. 
43 
Alongside this view on patents as an instrument that promotes and protects innovation, stands 
the access to medicines discussion, with the World Health Organization being the biggest voice. 
All the medical innovations, health technologies and novel drugs, have resulted in a drastic 
reduction of deaths, transforming many of the formerly deadly diseases to curable or at least 
manageable, also thanks to the intellectual property systems which have increased their 
importance over the last decades. Nevertheless, currently over one third of the world’s 
population has no access to the benefits of the modern medicines and continues to die every 
day. While in the developed part of the world, many dangerous diseases and infections have 
disappeared, such as the infamous HIV/AIDS, in many countries all over the world this disease 
is still the main cause of death, for example in sub-Saharan Africa (Boschiero, 2017). There is 
also the resurgence of many other infectious diseases and a growing amount of incommunicable 
diseases, which kill, according to WHO, over 50 million people per year. For these typologies 
of diseases, there are no incentives for pharmaceutical companies to invest in research, as the 
country in which these diseases are mostly widespread, do not offer profiting opportunities, 
even with the existence of intellectual property protection. These problems explain why the 
patent system in the pharmaceutical industry is at the very center of the global discussion on 
the obstacles that do not allow easy access to medicines to all people, notwithstanding a 
person’s wealth. For firms operating in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology field, the current 
way to finance and make available important innovations, is through the monopoly they enjoy 
after a patent is granted. The result of such market-driven and profit-oriented approach is that 
research in un-profitable diseases is simply not initiated by companies. At the moment, most 
R&D, are based on financial potential rather than the needs of the poorest and marginalized 
communities. Rare and neglected diseases that are affecting disproportionally small and poor 
proportions of populations, are not attractive enough to investors because of their low purchase 
power (Boschiero, 2017). Besides the non-existing research on particular areas, pharmaceutical 
firms exploit “evergreening” mechanisms to extend their monopoly indefinitely, requesting 
patents on small and very often pointless variations on the previous formulations (see Chapter 
Two), impeding access to medicines also with these legally allowed techniques.  
Notwithstanding the two views on patents, it is fundamental answering the question on whether 
the patent system is really the most efficient way to go, or other alternatives exist that do not 
directly or indirectly endanger the life of the poor populations in the least developed countries 
in the world. Some critics of the intellectual property-based systems have stated that they could 
be replaced by prize systems or government contracting, options that may be better suited to 
balance the price competition and innovation incentives (Grabowski, et al., 2015). Indeed, 
direct government contracting could substitute private firms' research and development 
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spending, while a prize system could be applied to specified drug innovations. In both cases 
these incentives would be funded by taxes. This increase in taxes for people would mean that 
they could almost immediately benefit from prices reduction on all the medicines covered by 
these programs (Grabowski, et al., 2015). This means that people that have an immediate need 
for specific drugs, that would normally be protected by intellectual property and regulatory 
exclusivity, would now have a much easier access, especially considering the price reduction. 
On the other hand, direct government contracting would require an efficient gathering of 
information and decision making that could bring uncertainty to the pharmaceutical industry. 
Another linked issue would be the decision on picking the winners, in an industry that is always 
changing and developing (in particular if you also consider the biotechnology field). 
Considering how the current lobbying from Big Pharma affects the international market, many 
governments could be more lenient towards specific firms, without an impartial evaluation of 
the winner. However, when there is no market available for certain diseases, as before 
mentioned, government incentives could be useful to increase the research on those areas. 
Adequate and consistent investments by governments, in underdeveloped therapeutic fields and 
the public health connection between developed and less-developed countries is highlighted by 
the recent examples with diseases like Zika and Ebola. 
The other alternative is the use of prizes, as they have the advantage of rewarding outputs 
instead of funding the research itself. This could reward other market participants, compared to 
the current industry. In any case, prize systems could be subject to several challenges, especially 
if they were to become patents substitute. According to Grabowski et al. (2015) prizes, most of 
the time, require clear and specified performance criteria, which it is likely to depend on one’s 
interpretation. Also, as the research and development in the pharmaceutical industry is long and 
costly, the incentive to invest could be subject to hold-up issues. Therefore, inventors could 
simply decide that the incentive is not high enough to justify the risk that they are going to 
incur, as government prizes are connected to how the government is operating at the moment. 
Indeed, budget constraints and legislature changes could reduce the initially established prizes, 
or in any case cause destabilization to the market. 
The debate on how to design a balanced intellectual property system that at the same time 
rewards the inventor and protects public health is destined to be crucial in the next years. On 
one side, patents’ do represent a threat in poor populations. However, an efficient patent system 
with targeted R&D incentives to address unmet needs when market incentives are inadequate, 
alongside with policies encouraging price competition and the use of generics, is likely to 
remain the core approach for achieving these objectives. 
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Within this context, our aim in the next sections is to find how much different are the countries 
in terms of research expenditure, profitability and efficiency of R&D. In addition, we would 
like to find some relationships between the profitability of a country and its patenting strategies. 
More specifically, our ultimate objective is to understand if a model that has the characteristics 
of the Indian one could be applied to more advanced countries. First of all, we will start from 
analyzing research and development data from the main pharmaceutical companies all over the 
world, dividing them in geographical areas: Europe, USA, Japan, India and China. Second, we 
will focus on the comparison between Europe and India, trying to assess the efficiency of R&D 
with respect to the patent system. Finally, we will study whether the Indian patent system can 
be applied to the European countries and if there is one more suitable in terms of research 
stimulation and public health protection.  
 
3.2 R&D costs in the world 
Our data on research and development are based on the yearly R&D survey issued by the 
European Union, from 2013 to 2019. Looking for data on research and development is quite 
difficult because usually they are information that companies dislike disseminating, to maintain 
their inventions as secret as possible, especially if they represent a technological advance. In 
addition, it is impossible, with publicly available documentation, to understand what part of the 
R&D cost is devoted to which type of research. In definitive, this survey-based dataset is the 
only source of information that we have been able to gather together. Each yearly survey 
contains the first 2500 companies in terms of research and development expenditure in the 
world (but based in Europe), in all industries. Filtering by the pharmaceutical industry and 
trying to maintain consistency over the period in analysis, we have obtained data for 119 
pharmaceutical companies from Europe, USA, Japan, India and China. We then extracted all 
firms’ R&D costs, profit, and number of employees. With the word “consistency” we mean that 
we have taken into account only the firms that were present in the dataset during the entire 
period in analysis (i.e. 2013-2019). In addition, there were few specific data that were not 
available at all. For example, for the Indian company Cipla, the number of employees for the 
year 2015 was not present in the 2015 Survey. As our objective was to obtain a large dataset, 
instead of eliminating the company from our data, we applied the average growth rate for that 
parameter to find out the missing data.   
Nevertheless, most of these companies are from the European, American and Japanese 
industries, while India and China account for 10 companies out of 119. Notwithstanding the 
differences between these areas, this is the most comprehensive dataset we have been able to 
retrieve from publicly available information. 
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We will start our analysis from a general overview on the total research and development costs 
during the period in analysis. 
 
Figure 9: Total R&D costs during the period 2013-2019, in millions of Euros (source: own elaboration) 
Unsurprisingly, the companies that spend more in research are from the USA and Europe, with 
the other countries really behind. Also, the total expenditure in Europe and in India are larger 
than USA and China, respectively. Nonetheless, it is worth to note that the figure is largely 
affected by the number of pharmaceutical firms for each group. The next figure may be more 
revealing, because instead of the total costs, shows the average costs for each geographical area. 
 
Figure 10: Average R&D costs during the period 2013-2019, in millions of Euros (source: own elaboration) 
While the general result from the previous figure apply also in this case, here it appears that the 
USA spends in average more than any other countries. 
Looking at the previous figure from another point of view, i.e. the growth in the R&D 
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Figure 11: Growth rate in total R&D spending during the period 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
From the graph it is clear that in terms of growth in research expenditure, the result depicted in 
the previous figures is quite the opposite in this case. This is not a surprising result as it is rather 
obvious that India is a developing country, so as the economy develops so does the 
pharmaceutical industry. The following figure immediately shows this result. 
 
Figure 12: Average growth rate in R&D spending during the period 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
Countries like Japan and Europe, but also the USA, have a lower growth in R&D compared to 
China and India. This is due to the fact that the pharmaceutical industries in the former countries 
have started their development at the beginning of the 19th Century, hence they are already 
mature industries. China, and especially India, are countries that have seen their pharmaceutical 
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It is also interesting to assess the R&D profitability of the countries, focusing particularly on 
the Indian and European peculiarities. This parameter is calculated as the ratio between the total 
profit of the country to the total expenditure in R&D, and allows us to determine, in broad 
terms, how many units of profit are generated by investing in research. We are aware that is a 
rather indicative measure of how much the profitability of a company is affected by the 
investments in research, especially considering that each pharmaceutical company has their 
own specific needs and follows different paths. Nonetheless, it is a measure that is readily 
available from our database, and it is easy to use for comparison purposes. We can indicate the 





Where RDTE is the total expenditure in research and development in each year and TP is the 
value of total profit for firms in each year. 
 
Figure 13: Profit to R&D in Europe during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
It is immediately noticeable that the spending in R&D in Europe has been following a growing 
path, from the 40 billion of Euros in 2013, but in 2019 this growth has stopped. On the other 
side, total profits have been more subject to variations during the period, while remaining above 
the research costs, except for 2019. Furthermore, the average R&D profitability during 2013-
2019 has been 1.17, meaning that in Europe, a unit of investment in research, generate, 
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Figure 14: Profit to R&D in USA during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
For what concerns the United States’ companies, the R&D profitability follows a different 
pattern if compared to the previous figure. The main difference here, is that American 
companies’ profits are always way higher than the investment in research, in every year of our 
dataset. In average, the R&D profitability is higher than Europe, with a value of 1.54.  
 
Figure 15: Profits to R&D in Japan during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
The Japanese figure is really interesting considering that the profit is much lower than both 
Europe and USA, while it would be easy to imagine similar patterns in all three territories, 
because of the similar economies. Here the average R&D profitability is only 0.73, meaning 
that a unit of investment in R&D, generate only 0.73 units of profit. This inefficiency is of 
course affected by the sample size of our dataset, but another sign of this fact could rely on the 
aspect that Japan is not one of the leading countries in the pharmaceutical industry, as they 
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Figure 16: Profits to R&D in China during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
Compared to the previous countries, Chinese companies are profiting more from research, as 
the average R&D profitability is much higher than Japan, USA and Europe, being 2.16. The 
figure also shows an impressive growing in R&D expenditure during the last years. 
 
Figure 17: Profits to R&D in India during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
Finally, India’s figure depicts a result that is similar to the Chinese case, but with a R&D 
profitability higher than all the previous country, being 2.40. So, a unit of investment in 
research, for the Indian companies, can generate in average 2.40 units of profit. 
The previous results, while being affected by the sample characteristics and the number of 
companies in the dataset, immediately allow us to classify the countries from the most 
productive to the least ones. If compared to the results from the total expenditure in R&D, here 
we have opposite results. China and India are the countries that have the highest productivity 





















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
R&D Profitability in China (2013-2019)
















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
R&D Profitability in India (2013-2019)
R&D Profits Profits to R&D
51 
Another interesting result that is possible to extrapolate from our dataset is the R&D 
expenditure normalized by the number of employees of all companies in each country, and we 
can call this new parameter “R&D Efficiency”. This is an interesting indicator that can be used 
to capture the efficiency of research in the countries in analysis, based on the number of 





Where RDTE is again the total expenditure in research and development in each year, and TNE 
is the total number of employees in each country in each year. 
 
Figure 18: R&D Efficiency rate during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
The most efficient country in the World are the USA, and it seems that their efficiency has been 
increasing at a considerable rate during the last three years, while the other countries has been 
maintaining a sort of status quo in this regard. Japan has been consistently more efficient than 
Europe, which is the third in this figure. India and China are the least efficient countries. This 
result may be affected by the high population in those countries as well as to the dimension of 
the companies in the dataset. We understand that this measure cannot really capture how 
efficient all employees are when companies invest in research, but can give a general idea on 
the efforts put by the employees in the research and development activities. The next figure 
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Figure 19: Average R&D Efficiency rate during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
Comparing these results to the R&D profitability, an interesting case study is the Japanese case. 
With regard to the profitability of research in Japan, it is the lowest among the countries in our 
dataset, but the efficiency of research is quite similar to Europe and USA, meaning that even if 
Japan does not profit much from the pharmaceutical industry, their efficiency in research, 
compared to the number of employees is quite outstanding. 
To sum up our analysis of the research and development data in the sample, for the countries 
considered, we can state few considerations. First of all, Europe and USA have always been the 
top countries in terms of investments in R&D and total profit. As a result, their profitability has 
always been higher than one. Second, their spending in research has not been increasing much, 
as opposed to India and China, which, even though in general terms obtains lower profits and 
also have lower investments in R&D, have much bigger profitability rates. Finally, the research 
efficiency rates confirms the American and European leadership in this field, with Japan being 
the third most efficient country, even though it does not profit much from the pharmaceutical 
sector. 
 
3.3 Patents in the world 
As our dataset contains data of European-based firms, regardless of their country of origin, to 
maintain consistency, we gathered patents data from the European Patent Office (EPO)12. All 
enterprises are required to request patent grants to the EPO, if they want to patent their product 
in any European country (unless they want to patent the product only in one European country). 
We considered the number of patent applications, rather than the number of patent grants, as 
the latter are more prone to subjective evaluations, and we considered them inappropriate for 
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our analysis. On the other hand, the number of patent applications are more objective, as they 
represent the actual effort put by pharmaceutical companies to try to protect and profit from 
their research and development results.  
In the following table, we gathered together data on total patents applications by the same 
countries contained on our previous dataset: Europe, USA, India, Japan, China, with the 
addition of the World data. 
Table 6: Total patent applications in Europe during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
 Europe USA JAPAN CHINA INDIA WORLD 
2013 73,575 34,011 22,405 4,075 562 148,027 
2014 75,875 36,668 22,118 4,680 541 152,703 
2015 76,194 42,597 21,421 5,728 577 160,004 
2016 76,038 40,032 20,943 7,092 761 159,087 
2017 78,493 42,463 21,774 8,641 678 166,594 
2018 81,594 43,789 22,591 9,480 699 174,481 
2019 82,493 46,201 22,066 12,247 637 181,406 
TOTAL 543,972 285,761 153,318 51,943 4,455 1,142,302 
 
With no particular surprise, Europe is the first “country” in terms of patent applications, 
followed by USA and Japan. China is quite behind in this ranking, while India is really on the 
bottom, confirming its low relevance in the research sector, in particular in the pharmaceutical 
industry, as we see from the next table. 
Table 7: Total pharmaceutical patent applications in Europe during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
 Europe USA JAPAN CHINA INDIA WORLD 
2013 2,628 1,815 382 114 9 5,568 
2014 2,492 1,815 309 119 7 5,369 
2015 2,586 2,257 374 128 8 6,055 
2016 2,661 1,962 384 158 7 5,849 
2017 2,774 2,316 454 212 9 6,534 
2018 3,067 2,651 482 289 10 7,371 
2019 3,145 3,026 393 238 11 7,697 
TOTAL 19,353 15,842 2,778 1,258 61 44,443 
 
Comparing the total patent applications with the total pharmaceutical patent applications 
presented to the European Patent Office, we find that the latter account only for 3.89% of the 
total applications. This means that during the period from 2013 to 2019, a tiny portion of the 
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patent applications were relative to the pharmaceutical industry. We can find the same 
information also for the other countries, as depicted from the below table. 
Table 8: Total applications and pharmaceutical patents comparison for the period 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
 Europe USA JAPAN CHINA INDIA WORLD 
Patents applications 
(Total) 
543,972 285,761 153,318 51,943 4,455 1,142,302 
Pharmaceutical 
patents applications 
19,353 15,842 2,778 1,258 61 44,443 
Pharmaceutical/Total 3,56% 5,54% 1,81% 2,42% 1,37% 3,89% 
 
Looking at the percentages above, USA is the country that applies for more pharmaceutical 
patents compared to the total patent requests. India and Japan are the countries that request 
fewer pharmaceutical patents, but for two different reasons. India is a country that in general 
does not depend a lot from patents, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, as mentioned in 
Chapter Two, because of the high specialization of the generic industry. Japan, on the other 
hand, applies for a considerable number of patents but in different industries, since does not 
have a highly developed pharmaceutical industry, if compared to Europe, USA and India. 
Using the previous data, but considering them annually from 2013 to 2019, it is possible to 
bring a new parameter at the table, that we can call “Pharma Intensity” and we define it as: 




Where PPA is the number of pharmaceutical patents applications and TPA, is the total 
pharmaceutical applications. 
Table 9: Pharma Intensity during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
Pharma  
intensity 
Europe USA JAPAN CHINA INDIA 
2013 0,0357 0,0534 0,0170 0,0280 0,0160 
2014 0,0330 0,0495 0,0140 0,0254 0,0129 
2015 0,0339 0,0530 0,0175 0,0223 0,0139 
2016 0,0350 0,0490 0,0183 0,0223 0,0092 
2017 0,0353 0,0545 0,0209 0,0245 0,0133 
2018 0,0376 0,0605 0,0213 0,0305 0,0143 




Figure 20: Evolution of the Pharma intensity during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
The table and the figure above confirm the results stated beforehand, but it is surprising to note 
that the USA and India have seen their index growing after 2016, while the other countries have 
been more or less constant, since 2014. 
For our purpose, it is compelling to introduce another parameter, that derives from the previous 
pharma intensity. We would like to weigh our index, to the World’s pharma intensity, to find 
out how much a specific country concentrates their economies on the pharmaceutical industry, 
with respect to the entirety of our data. We have two different ways to approach the “weighting 
process”: one involves using the total patent data, including the country we want to weight, and 
in the second approach we remove the country from the total patent data. We will show both 
approaches, and see that they do not differ so much, especially in the Indian Case. 










Where the numerator is the Pharma Intensity defined before, and the denominator is composed 
respectively by the world pharmaceutical patents applications (WPPA) and the total world 
patents applications (TWPA). We define the denominator as World Pharma Intensity index 
(WPI). Furthermore, with regards to the two approaches before mentioned, we call WPI1 the 
parameter that includes the country that we want to weigh, while WPI2 is the parameter that 
does not include the country in analysis. 
In the next table and figure, we find all the specialization indexes for the period 2013-2019, 
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2013 0,9496 1,4187 0,4533 0,7437 0,4257 
2014 0,9377 1,4078 0,3973 0,7232 0,3680 
2015 0,8969 1,4001 0,4614 0,5905 0,3664 
2016 0,9518 1,3330 0,4987 0,6060 0,2502 
2017 0,9011 1,3906 0,5316 0,6255 0,3384 
2018 0,8898 1,4331 0,5050 0,7216 0,3386 
2019 0,8985 1,5436 0,4198 0,4580 0,4070 
 
 
Figure 21: Evolution of the Specialization Index (WPI1) during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
The general result from the Pharma intensity parameter, it obviously applies also here, 
especially if one considers Figure 20 and Figure 21, since we only divided each Index by the 
same value on the denominator for every year. What it is interesting here is that we can use this 
parameter as an important indicator on each country’s specialization in the pharmaceutical 
sector. We can state that the following conditions:   
• If SPEC>1, the country is more than specialized in the pharmaceutical sector; 
• If SPEC<1, the country is less than specialized in the pharmaceutical sector. 
If we consider the following figure, showing the average Specialization indexes, we have a 
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Figure 22: Average Specialization Index (WPI1) during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
The USA is the only country that is more than specialized in the pharmaceutical industry, while 
Europe’s parameter is slightly lower than 1. India is the least specialized country, with a SPEC 
of only 0.36. Japan and China also are not so specialized in the sector which is an additional 
confirmation of the result we have found in the previous sections. 
Now, we apply the second parameter regarding the world pharma intensity, i.e. WPI2, where 
we remove from the denominator of the pharma intensity, the country we want to assess. In this 
way, we can make a better comparison, with no data conflict, since the variable we want to find 
is not affected by itself. 
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Figure 24: Average Specialization Index (WPI2) during 2013-2019 (source: own elaboration) 
In Figure 23, we see no particular differences with the previous results. The only comment 
worth making is that there has been a general down shift of the indexes. Nevertheless, as the 
formula of the Specialization Index is: 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 𝑃𝐼
𝑊𝑃𝐼
, if we remove a country from the World 
Pharma Intensity, it could be immediate to think that the SPEC would lower. However, as the 
WPI is a ratio itself, the removal of the country affects only the denominator of this ratio, 
increasing as a result the WPI. In definitive, the Specialization Index, decreases when we 
remove a country. This result is confirmed by Figure 24, where we see a widespread reduction 
in the average indexes. The more patents a specific country applied for, the more is the resulting 
difference of the two indexes, i.e. WPI1 and WPI2. For example, since the number of patents 
both in the pharmaceutical sector and in the total applications for India are quite small, we see 
that both parameters are 0.36. On the other hand, for Europe and USA, which had a more 
sizeable number of patent applications, we find that WPI1 and WPI2 are a little bit different. In 
any case, we will consider WPI1 for our analysis, as the difference between the two parameters, 
are quite negligible. 
 
3.4 Indian model applicability 
From our analysis of the dataset from the EU R&D Surveys and the data on patents from the 
European Patent Office, we can make few general comments, in particular on the differences 
of the country-specific models. 
First of all, we find that advanced countries (USA and Europe) are the biggest spenders in 
research and development in the pharmaceutical sector, while India and China are the countries 
that invest less, in proportion, in R&D. If instead we consider the average growth rate in 
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in analysis, i.e. 2013-2019, China and India have been growing on average, by 23.68% and 
17,36% respectively. On the other hand, USA and Europe have been growing at a much lower 
rate (see Figure 12). This means that, even though their total investments in R&D in the 
pharmaceutical sector have been much lower than the other countries in the dataset, their 
average growth has been much bigger during the last years. Therefore, we can expect that the 
differences in the total investments in research will reduce in the imminent future., when 
developing countries will reach the first world countries level, at least in economics terms. 
Second, we have introduced a parameter which is the R&D profitability (i.e. RDP), defined as 
the ratio between the total profits of the countries and the total expenditure in research and 
development for the enterprises in each country. In this case, we have a different scenario and 
we find that the countries that profit more based on their research investments are India and 
China, with a value of 2.40 and 2.16 respectively. In this case, quite surprisingly, Japan is the 
country that profit less from their research investments in the pharmaceutical sector, with a 
value of 0.73. The USA and Europe, have a much smaller value of profitability compared to 
China and India, being almost the half (1.17 for Europe and 1.54 for USA). Indeed, it is worth 
noting that India and China, have, as stated before-hand been growing a lot in terms of 
expenditure in R&D during 2013-2019, This means that, despite the usual theory on India as a 
country that is mostly specialized in the generic drugs industry - so does not invest a lot of 
resources in R&D - here we find that the Indian companies do actually invest and are also very 
profitable, similarly to China. 
Third, if we consider the efficiency of R&D in the dataset, defining a new parameter, i.e. RDE, 
as the ratio between each countries’ expenditure in research and the total number of employees, 
we find results similar to the previous points. More specifically, we find that the USA is the 
most efficient country, with Japan and Europe as the next in this ranking. China and India, 
probably because of their large populations and firms’ size, are not quite efficient. 
Moving on with the data on patents from the EPO database, we find that the previous rankings 
on the research expenditures are more or less confirmed with the number of patent applications. 
Europe and USA are the countries that request patens to the EPO offices the most, while India 
does not rely so much on patents. China and Japan request a relevant number of patents, but we 
will see that their total pharmaceutical patents are not really relevant compared to their total 
applications. 
Indeed, if we compare pharmaceutical patents applications to each country’s totals, we have 
similar results, and in general we have that the former accounts for less than 4%, on average 
with respect to the total applications. Hence, the relevance of pharmaceutical patents in Europe 
is not very high during the period we analyzed.  
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With the previous results, we have established another noteworthy parameter, which we called 
the “Pharma Intensity”, i.e. PI. This parameter allows us to measure the impact of 
pharmaceutical patents applications to the total applications, to assess the “effort” put by each 
country in the pharmaceutical sector. A higher rate means that the country puts more effort than 
a one with a lower rate. USA and Europe are the countries that concentrate their efforts in the 
pharmaceutical sector most, and this is not very impressive as the most important firms in the 
world, operating in this industry are either from the US or based in Europe.  
Starting from the previous result, an additional “improvement” of the pharma intensity index 
consists in “weighing” the index to the world specialization index. We called this parameter 
“Specialization Index” (SPEC), and it is a double ratio: the first Pharma Intensity, over the 
World Pharma Intensity (WPI). We have defined the latter in two different ways, one in which 
the country in analysis is included in the WPI parameter (WPI1), and one in which we have 
removed it because of consistence purposes (WPI2). We find that the differences of the two 
variables are not very relevant and they do not alter our arguments. Mathematically, the 
specialization index is a parameter that can take a value higher or lower than one. We have 
stated that if the parameter is bigger than one, than the country is more than specialized in the 
pharmaceutical sector, while if it is lower than one, then we have the opposite case. 
Our results (if we consider WPI1 as parameters) tell that the United States is the country with 
the highest specialization index, with a value of 1.42. The second most specialized “nation” is 
obviously Europe, but with a parameter much lower than one, 0.92. The country that has the 
least degree of specialization in the pharmaceutical industry is India. 
Now that we have depicted all the results, we have been able to retrieve from the dataset and 
the patents data from the EPO, we are ready to do a simple regression analysis to reply to our 
main question: is the Indian model applicable to more advanced economies? More in details, 
we want to find if a model based on low specialization in the pharmaceutical sector, hence a 
low world specialization index, is able to stimulate research and being able to generate enough 
profits to continue their activities, nonetheless. For this purpose, we will see what happens when 
we let our variables on the R&D Survey dataset, shown in the following table, interact with the 
weighted specialization indexes and the number of employees (proxy for the firms’ size).  
Table 11: EU R&D Survey dataset variables 
Variables Description 
Region Region of origin of the pharmaceutical firms 
Year The dataset contains data from 2013 to 2019 
R&D  Total expenditure in research 
Profits Total profits 
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Employees Number of employees for the companies 
R&D profitability Total Profits over total R&D  
Specialization index Pharma intensity over World pharma intensity 
 
In other terms, we want to assess how much the specialization index “affect” the growth in 
research for the countries. We already have seen that research and development growth in India 
is not as low as one could think, so it is interesting to understand if its lower specialization in 
the sector is irrelevant when it comes to the growth of R&D and the profitability. If we are able 
to verify that patenting strategies are not so relevant when it comes to stimulating research 
expenditure, then we can presume, very theoretically, that we can apply a patent system such 
as the Indian one also in more advanced economies, without prejudicing a country’s research 
activities.  
 
3.5 Empirical model 
Our simple empirical model has the objective to identify some connections between the 
research and development profitability and the specialization indexes, using the number of 
employees as a proxy for the firms’ size. In this case, we slightly modified our dataset, with 
respect to the previous analysis, considering all negative profits as zero. This change affects the 
following table, where the means and standard deviation of the profit to R&D ratios are shown. 
Table 12: Mean and St. Dev of R&D Profitability  












N° Obs 588 259 175 21 49 
Mean 1.265793 1.067493 1.547055 2.16509 2.494302 
St. Dev. 1.555801 1.464985 1.26162 1.659855 1.877999 
 
Indeed, from the table above, we see that while Europe, China, and India’s means are similar 
to the ones discussed beforehand, the USA, and especially Japan, have seen their averages 
change. This is of course due to our modification of the negative profits on the dataset, but for 
our analysis, these changes in the countries’ means does not affect the general results.  
Our empirical model considers the relationship between the R&D profitability, that is a measure 
of the “productivity” or “profitability” of a country in the pharmaceutical sector, and the 
specialization index of each country, that can be assumed to represent the “business model” of 
a country. We also added the employees’ numbers to take into account the firms’ size. It is 
important to state that the two measures are expressed in very broad terms as productivity and 
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business model indicator, and we are aware that they are not totally representative of the reality. 
However, they are the best indicators that we have been able to retrieve from the (few) data that 
we managed to gather together. We can write our model as the following equation: 
 
ln(𝑅𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡         (1) 
 
where (RDP) is the profit-to-R&D ratio of firm i in year t, lnSPECct is the (natural log of) 
pharmaceutical specialization index, computed as the ratio between the share of pharmaceutical 
patents in country c in year t and the corresponding share computed at the world level, lnEMP 
is the (natural log of) firm’s total employment, used as a proxy of firm size, while αi, t, and εit 
are, respectively, the vector of firm-specific fixed effects, the vector of year-specific fixed 
effects and the stochastic error component.  
Equation 1 is estimated using a fixed-effects estimator with standard errors clustered at the firm 
level, as we are only interested in analyzing the impact of variables that vary over time. The 
fixed-effects estimator has been used also because we cannot assume that firms’ parameters 
(for example the employees’ number) are random and uncorrelated with the independent 
variable in the model, therefore it is more suitable than the random-effects estimator. In 
addition, we do not have reasons to believe that differences across entities have some influences 
on our dependent variable. In the following estimates’ table, we have additional confirmation 
of the correct use of the fixed-effects model, as the R squared within groups are always higher 
than the R squared overall. 
 
Table 13: The profit-on-R&D returns of pharmaceutical specialization (fixed effects panel estimates) 
DEP VAR: ln(RDP) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(SPEC)t-1 0.668**    
 (0.210)    
lnEMPt-1 0.060 0.059 0.058  
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)  
ln(SPEC EU)t-1  0.035 0.345  
  (0.916) (0.569)  
ln(SPEC India)t-1  1.179** 1.142** 1.162** 
  (0.366) (0.357) (0.361) 
ln(SPEC USA)t-1  0.910  0.773 
  (1.612)  (0.938) 
ln(SPEC Japan)t-1  0.148   
  (0.265)   
ln(SPEC China)t-1  2.193***   
  (0.155)   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.358 0.277 0.312 0.259 
 (0.338) (0.373) (0.372) (0.386) 
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N 714 714 714 714 
R2 within 0.055 0.074 0.057 0.058 
R2 overall 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.003 
Nr. cluster 119 119 119 119 
VIF 1.49 29.18 1.44 1.45 
Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
 
Looking at the table, we have in the first column the estimates from Equation 1, and we 
immediately notice that our specialization index has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with the profit to R&D ratio. This means that a positive variation of the 
specialization index results in a positive variation of our dependent variable, and vice versa. 
In the second regression, instead of considering the world specialization index, we considered 
each country’s specialization indexes to identify the differences between the Indian and 
European firms. All specialization indexes are positive, but only India and China have 
statistically significant estimates, which are also much higher than the other ones. 
Unfortunately, as the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) test is quite high, it means that there is a 
high degree of multicollinearity, so in columns 3 and 4 we remove some of the independent 
variables and focus on the Indian case. In column 3 our main independent variables are the 
Indian and European specialization index and see that the VIF test result is quite low, so there 
is almost no multicollinearity, and also that the estimates are more or less unchanged compared 
to column 2. The previous result is also confirmed by column 4, where instead of the European 
specialization index, we consider the American one. In both columns 3 and 4, Indian estimates 
of the specialization are statistically significant and much higher than European and American 
estimates. In general, from our estimates, we find a positive relationship between the profit to 
R&D ratio - the productivity/profitability indicator - and the specialization index, which instead 
is the “business model” indicator. As the Indian estimates are quite high, we can presume that 
even if the country is not very specialized in the pharmaceutical sector, its productivity is quite 
high, nonetheless. In other terms, even if India is more specialized in the generic drugs industry, 
and request fewer patents as a consequence, it’s still able to be more profitable than much more 
specialized countries in our dataset, if we consider the total investments in R&D. From column 
3, as an example, we see that a 1% increase in the Indian specialization index would generate a 





The pharmaceutical sector is an industry where reconciling private and public interests at the 
same time is one of the hardest jobs in the world. We have seen that TRIPS, as the principal 
instrument to regulate and somehow control intellectual properties around the world - where 
world means all the countries part of the WTO – has been subject to numerous critics, from 
those who thought that the Agreement would have endangered underdeveloped countries, but 
also positive feedback, especially from those who consider intellectual property protection as 
the main instrument to stimulate research and development. Focusing in particular on patents, 
which are the most relevant intellectual property tool in the pharmaceutical industry, they must 
possess, according to TRIPS, three key features: novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness. 
Even if these three characteristics could seem reasonable from a neutral perspective, it is worth 
noting that they have no clear definition in the TRIPS Agreement, so it is a matter of 
interpretation of each national patent office. This reason, together with the fact that each country 
that wanted to enter or remain in the WTO had to oblige to TRIPS and establish uniform rules 
for intellectual property protection, led to lots of discussion around this matter. As of 2020, only 
the countries listed as LDC’s13 by the United Nations are exempted until 2033 from complying 
with TRIPS, but the Agreement has been compulsory for the other countries. As it entered into 
force in 2004, after several years of negotiation, it forced all countries to create a uniform patent 
system. All advanced nations, like the US and the European Union, already had established 
quite stable patent systems over time, so they did not have to change their patent laws quite 
much. On the other hand, developing countries were often forced to radically modify their 
patent systems to comply with TRIPS. One of those countries was India, which has always been 
one of the nations with the strictest patent system, in the sense that requesting a patent in that 
country has always been very difficult. The main reason for this strictness was due to the fact 
that India tried to protect its critical generic drugs industry and to maintain the role of 
“pharmacy of the third world”. Since it was impossible for the country to refuse compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement, they established a specific section on the Indian Patents’ Act to 
circumvent the Agreement to increase public health protection.  
Furthermore, we compared European and Indian patent systems, and we found that, even 
though they have similar evaluation criteria (which is obvious if you consider that they all are 
countries part of the WTO), the procedures to request a patent are quite different. While in 
Europe we have a uniform system and also quite inexpensive, in India, requesting a patent is 
 
13 List of LDC’s countries available at: https://unctad.org/topic/vulnerable-economies/least-developed-
countries/list 
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very hard and impossible to perform if you are not assisted by professionals. Indeed, according 
to Indian patent laws, you must fill out almost 20 different applications and provide a huge 
number of documentations. In Europe, the procedure is simpler as everything is done through 
an online portal. Last but not least, in India, if you consider the average wealth of the population, 
it is very costly to request a patent, and also to renew it before it expires. Applying for a patent 
is much less costly in Europe, and both the application procedure and the costs will reduce 
further when the Unitary Patent is introduced in 2021. 
Because in this thesis our objective was to understand if a model characterized by a low R&D 
specialization in the pharmaceutical sector (e.g. low patent requests) and a strict patent system, 
like India, can be applied to a more advanced economy, like Europe, maintaining at the same 
time a good level of productivity/profitability. For this purpose, we first studied the European 
and Indian pharmaceutical industries. Unsurprisingly, in Europe, there are countries like 
Switzerland, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK that invested almost 30 billion Euros in R&D 
in 2018 (according to EFPIA). India’s data was not available, but according to IBEF, the 
country’s investment in research in 2018 has been estimated to be more or less 8% of the total 
revenues, which was 18.2 billion dollars in that year. So, the difference between the two areas 
is quite sizeable. Another interesting distinction between Europe and India is that in proportion, 
Indian companies invest a higher percentage in research compared to their profits. In addition, 
the higher investments in R&D in European countries is more than compensated by their profits. 
Furthermore, Indian industry size (in terms of sales) and investment in R&D have been growing 
a lot in recent years, so Europe, but also the US, should expect that in the next years, the 
difference between the countries will reduce more and more. Finally, Indian specialization in 
the generic drugs industry is corroborated by the data, showing that more than 70% of the 
pharmaceutical industry is devoted to that field. However, it is interesting that few countries in 
Europe, such as Italy, reach similar percentages for the generics industry, even though on 
average the entire generic industry in Europe is not quite as large as the Indian one. 
As mentioned before, we also compared the European and Indian patent systems numerically, 
and have seen that there are some important differences. In Europe, during 2010-2019, the 
number of pharmaceutical patent applications has been consistently over 5000, with at least 
1000 approved each year. In India, however, we have much fewer requests for patents, and also 
minimal quantities of patents have been approved, confirming the stricter patent laws.  
After distinguishing Indian and European models, we gathered research and development data 
from the EU R&D Survey, which contains data from the 2500 companies that invest most in 
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R&D in Europe14, for the period 2013-2019. After the selection of European, American, 
Japanese, Chinese, and Indian firms, we selected a few key variables and performed a 
descriptive analysis. First, we found that European and American firms invest most in R&D but 
have much lower growth rates in R&D expenditures than Chinese and Indian firms. In 
numerical terms, India’s average growth rate in R&D investments during 2013-2019 has been 
17%, while the European one has been 5%. Second, we defined a new parameter that we called 
R&D Profitability (RDP), which can be interpreted as a productivity parameter, that shows how 
much a country profits from investing in research and development. We found that the most 
productive countries are India and China, while Japan is the least productive. This result is 
outstanding if we think that India is seen as a country that is not considered a great innovator, 
but here we have that its research investments are very productive. Third, we assessed the 
efficiency of research in each country, defining another parameter, which we denominated 
R&D Efficiency (RDE), that relates the number of employees and the expenditure in research 
and development. Here, we have that the most efficient countries are USA, Europe and Japan, 
while China and India, are the least efficient ones, probably due to the firms’ size. 
Since we were also interested in studying the patenting strategies of the countries in the dataset, 
we extracted patents data from the European Patent Office (EPO) database. We found that 
during 2013-2019, more than 1 million patent applications have been presented to the EPO. 
However, only a small portion of them were pharmaceutical patents, less than 4%. The 
countries that have requested most pharmaceutical patents are the USA and Europe, which is 
not a surprise. On the other hand, India requested less than 100 pharmaceutical patents during 
the entire period, confirming its predilection for the generic drugs industry. With these data, we 
defined an interesting measure, the Pharma Intensity (PI), that measures the share of 
pharmaceutical patents of a country with respect to the total applications. Since this measure is 
not very interesting by itself, we have “weighted” it with the world value. The new 
Specialization Index (SPEC) allows us to assess each country’s specialization in the 
pharmaceutical sector. The most specialized country is the USA, followed by Europe and 
China, and India, again, is the least specialized country.  
Our empirical model tried to shed light on the inconsistency between the low specialization in 
the sector and the high profitability of the Indian pharmaceutical companies. The model had the 
objective of finding a relationship between the profit-to-R&D ratio and the specialization index. 
Our fixed-effects model showed a positive and statistically significant relationship between the 
two variables. A positive increase in the world specialization index results in a positive variation 
 
14 It is important to note that all firms in the dataset are based in Europe, regardless of their country of origin. 
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of the profit-to-R&D ratio. When we look at the specific countries, we find that India’s 
estimates have always been statistically significant and much higher than both the American 
and European estimates. Therefore, an increase in the Indian specialization index could increase 
the country’s productivity, more than what would happen in Europe and USA. To conclude, 
this result contradicts the usual views of India as a country that solely depends on the generic 
drugs industry and does not invest in R&D because of their low profitability. Instead, our data 
suggests the opposite. Nevertheless, it is important to say that we have not found a direct 
causality between the variables, and our assumptions have been quite loose. Anyhow, a system 
like the Indian one, characterized by low specialization in the pharmaceutical sector but high 
productivity, may be considered as a good example of operating in the industry without denying 
poor populations access to fundamental medicines, requesting unethical patents. In addition, 
India has also been the second country in terms of growth in the pharmaceuticals research and 
development expenditure, but the patenting requests have not increased at all. This could show 
to those who justify patent protection as the main instrument to stimulate research in the 
pharmaceutical industry, that in reality, countries like India, that do not patent much, are 
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